Serious and costly performance problems riddle U.S. health care. Because of overuse, under use, and misuse of health care, researchers at the Juran Institute and elsewhere estimate that about 30 percent of health care costs are generated by poor quality. Therefore, poor quality medical care will cost about $720 billion in 2008 (30% of $2.4 trillion).

Poor quality also reduces productivity. For every dollar of health care spending caused by poor quality, poor care costs an estimated 50 cents in lost productivity. When applied to the $822 billion in care provided through employer-sponsored insurance, this translates to an additional $123 billion in costs.

A recent study by the Health Research Institute at PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that wasteful health care spending costs $1.2 trillion annually. Analyzing findings from a wealth of published studies, the PwC researchers looked at the cost of waste from clinically inappropriate care and overt errors, individual behaviors leading to costly health problems, and antiquated operational processes that add costs without providing any value.

Making matters worse, research on the care patients receive from physicians, hospitals, and other providers paints a frustrating, even scary picture. For example, studies conducted by the respected RAND Corporation show that Americans receive clinically inadequate or inappropriate care at shockingly high rates.

Specifically, RAND's research shows that acute care for insured adults is appropriate only 53.5 percent of the time on average. In other words, about 46 percent of acute care is clinically incorrect. Similarly, about 43.9 percent of chronic care and 45.1 percent of preventive care is inappropriate according to accepted medical standards. Children receive 68 percent of recommended care for acute medical problems, 53 percent of recommended care for chronic medical conditions, and 41 percent of recommended preventive care.

The bottom line is health care - whether for adults or children - is inappropriate or unnecessary about half the time. Basically, it's a coin flip.

Root Causes of Poor Quality, High Costs:

Ultimately, three immutable laws of economics explain the underlying causes of this poor performance:

1. Price is what you pay but value is what you get:

Taking a page from Warren Buffet's playbook, buyers of health benefits must focus on value, not price. Price is an important part of the equation but meaningless if you don't know the value of what you are receiving for that price. Unfortunately, in health care we obsess on unit prices. In no other marketplace or domain of life do Americans - corporations, consumers, federal and state policymakers, news media - pay so much attention to price and so little to value.

2. You get what you pay for:

Today, we pay for quantity, not quality. Poor performers are sustained and rewarded. The best performers are financially penalized and professionally demoralized. The consequences are all too obvious.

3. You can't fix what you can't see:

In sharp contrast to virtually every other industry, health care is highly opaque. American health care is full of decision makers - consumers, physicians, and other providers, health plans, public officials - who lack the information needed to make decisions.

Five Steps to Higher Performance:

The problems are daunting but solvable. To improve the quality and cost effectiveness of health care delivery, purchasers and payors must tightly focus on strategies to expect, measure, disclose, reward, and support results:

1. Expect Results:

2. Measure Results:

3. Disclose Results:

4. Reward Results:

5. Support Results:

Support the infrastructure and processes essential to results-driven health care. These include:

More purchasers and payors are moving away from simplistic cost-driven drug benefit designs to formularies and cost sharing based on value. The impact of value-based drug benefit designs on manufacturers will depend on how quickly individual firms adapt their business thinking and communications strategies.

Until recently, the path to success for a drug manufacturer was based largely on product novelty, physician-centric marketing, and revenue strategies balancing unit prices and concessions against formulary position.

To maximize market share and margins in the world of value-based drug benefit designs, drug manufacturers will need to:

(1) Demonstrate the clinical and economic case for each product and each therapeutic class with an indication,

(2) Build absolute and comparative evidence on a continuous basis,

(3) Develop new value-based pricing models and market partnerships, and

(4) Communicate far more effectively with public and private payors.

For many firms, this will require a significant, even scary change in thinking and tactics; payor-centric communications; comfort with a massive increase in transparency; and a greater willingness to partner. Therefore, while the financial risks of moving to a value-based world are daunting, ultimately the greatest challenges are intellectual.

Value-based drug benefit designs will pose the greatest challenges to manufacturers with product lines (or pipelines) dominated "me too" drugs; rigid, risk-adverse organizational silos; and out-dated, prescriber-centric communications.

The latest issue of the American Journal of Managed Care has several interesting articles on diabetes, demonstrating several opportunities to improve outcomes and reduce costs:

How Managed Care Organizations Contribute to Improved Diabetes Outcomes: Patricia Salber, MD, chief medical officer and SVP at Universal American, a large Medicare health and drug plan, outlines how MCOs are improving outcomes for patients with diabetes.

Diabetes Complications Severity Index and Risk of Mortality, Hospitalization, and Healthcare Utilization: This study show that the Diabetes Complications Severity Index (DCSI) performs better than complication counts and is a useful tool to predict mortality and hospitalization risk.

Lower Severe Hypoglycemia Risk: Insulin Glargine Versus NPH Insulin in Type 2 Diabetes: Findings shows cost savings and lower incidence of hypoglycemia with insulin glargine.

Diabetes Diagnosis, Resource Utilization, and Health Outcomes: Article highlights the clinical and economic case for much earlier detection of hyperglycemia.

Do Diabetes Group Visits Lead to Lower Medical Care Charges?: Findings show that group visits (shared medical appointments) significantly reduce outpatient costs of diabetes care, primarily by substituting group visits for more expensive individual specialty care visits.

To read or download all the articles in the January 2008 issue of AJMC, click here.

The journal Medical Care has published series of outstanding articles on emerging methods and tools to compare the effectiveness of medical therapies, prescription drugs, and devices. The peer-reviewed articles are an outgrowth from a symposium on comparative effectiveness research sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).

Here are links to the individual articles in PDF format:

The well-regarded industry trade journal Biotechnology Healthcare has an excellent article by Patrick Mullen on The Arrival of Average Sales Price. In it, Mr. Mullen interviews several top industry experts (yes, including me) on the rationale for and impact of Average Sales Price (ASP) and how health plans are following Medicare's lead:

Health plans are beginning to adopt the average sales price method of paying oncologists and other specialists for office-administered drugs. ASP is more transparent and has a smaller markup than its much maligned predecessor, average wholesale price. The speed of ASP uptake will affect everyone who makes, sells, prescribes, and takes these medications.

Average Sales Price and Drug Reimbursement:

In 2005, as part of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), the way Medicare Part B reimbursed physicians and clinics for biologics and other physician-administered injectable drugs changed fundamentally. Medicare Part B, the nation's largest payor of injectable drugs, started using Average Sales Price (ASP) to base payments for most drug products covered by Part B fee-for-service.

Using a new, tighter, and more accurate definition of ASP, drug manufacturers must report the Average Sales Price of each of their products. CMS, through its Part B claims processing contractors, reimburses physicians for covered drug products administered to Medicare benies at 106% of ASP, adjusted for volume.

Wide Ranging Impact of ASP in Marketplace:

Physician offices, particularly oncologists, have seen significant drops in Medicare revenue. While the impact on drug makers is mixed, overall the switch to ASP has tightened profit margins and required many manufacturers to revise projections.

Also, like the move of Medicaid to a new and publicly reported version of Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), the ASP reforms are another way drug prices are becoming transparent and flatter or less variable. The transformative effect on business practices and strategy should not be underestimated.

For Medicare Part B, the switch to ASP-based payment has saved billions of dollars and dramatically slowed the growth in Part B prescription drug spending. Beneficiaries have benefited as well, since they are paying the 20% Part B copay on lower prices. However, there is some evidence that some docs are switching drug therapies (which may or may not be clinically optimal for patients) or forcing patients to receive injections from other settings, such as outpatient hospitals. The behavioral effect on physician practices is still hard to discern beyond the realm of anecdote but is something worth monitoring closely, especially in light of low Medicare rates for professional fees.

To Learn More About ASP:

In addition to the article in Biotechnology Healthcare mentioned above, here are some MedPAC resources to understand ASP, Medicare spending on drugs and biologics, and Medicare reimbursement of physician services:

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made major, controversial, and technically complex changes to Medicaid prescription drug pricing and pharmacy reimbursement. The policy changes, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, present significant challenges to both drug manufacturers and retail pharmacies.

To implement the DRA changes, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued final rules that, most notably: (a) revise the definition of average manufacturer price (AMP), (b) create a new formula for calculating Federal Upper Limits (FULs) on multisource drugs, (c) require rebates for certain physician-administered drugs, and (d) clarify rebate liability for authorized generic drugs.

Significant Implications:

For pharmacies, the DRA changes represent significant cuts to Medicaid reimbursement - unless states act to mitigate the changes or increase dispensing fees to compensate for lower product reimbursement. While CMS tried to mitigate the impact on pharmacies, studies by GAO, OIG, and pharmacy trade groups suggest that pharmacies could easily lose money with many drugs dispensed under Medicaid, with the biggest loss in generic drugs.

The changes also hold major implications for pharmaceutical companies. The new policies create new financial, operational, and compliance challenges. They will require most drug makers to rethink pricing strategies and access the impact across all their classes of trade. Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), a calculation that has been a closely held secret under the law since 1991, will become transparent through monthly public reporting of AMP-based prices of every drug on sale in the U.S. You may expect this to have some interesting effects on marketplace behavior and payor negotiations. And, of course, the changes will increase rebate payments to states.

States will benefit from the resulting cost savings. However, state Medicaid directors face strong pressure from community and chain pharmacies to compensate for lost revenue. States also have concerns about the reliability of CMS and pharma industry data, especially in the first couple years given the big change in methodology, scope, and frequency of data reporting. States must also make a variety of systems changes under short notice.

Across the health care system, the DRA changes are further evidence of the increasing power of government policy on the pharmaceutical supply chain. Now that taxpayer-funded health programs pay for the majority of drugs, changes in Medicaid or Medicare drug policy are no longer limited to affected program. Federal changes ripple throughout the industry, forcing changes in commercial practices and business strategy.

Finally, the new rules put a few more nails in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or published prices.

Average Manufacturer Price:

In concept, Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) is the average unit price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the U.S. by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade. (Try to repeat that ten times fast.) However, how this plays out has been highly controversial, leading to inconsistencies across manufacturers, numerous highly critical studies by the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO), allegations of gaming, and countless law suits against drug makers by U.S. attorneys and state attorneys general.

Following the statutory changes made by the DRA, CMS' final rule makes several fundamental changes to AMP. Most notably, the final rule:

Prior to the DRA, sales by a manufacturer of covered outpatient drugs below 10% of AMP were defined as "nominal sales" and generally excluded from Medicaid best price. While the final rule continues to define nominal sales as those sales at less than 10% of AMP, the best price exemption will now be limited to sales to: 340B covered entities, intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF-MRs), and state-owned or operated nursing facilities.

Federal Upper Limits:

For twenty years, the federal rules have limited the amount state Medicaid programs may reimburse pharmacies for generic drugs. Using a Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for each affected drug product, the idea is to help ensure the government is a prudent buyer and pays close to market levels. Before the DRA, the FUL was set at 150% of the published price for the least costly therapeutic equivalent using all available national price compendia.

However, that never worked well. Over time, the old FUL system became very costly to states and problematic for nearly everyone involved.

As a result, the DRA changed the methodology used to establish a FUL on multiple source drugs:

Requirements for Drug Manufacturers:

To accomplish all these changes in AMP and FUL, the law creates new requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers. As I discussed in an earlier post, these new requirements, when coupled with the new approach to AMP, create significant financial, operational, and compliance challenges to pharma companies.

Most notably, pharma companies must:

Rebates on Physician-Administered Drugs:

Before DRA, most States did not collect rebates on physician-administered drugs. Physician drug claims typically did not contain the National Drug Codes (NDCs) necessary for state to invoice drug manufacturers for rebates. Per the DRA, the CMS rule requires states to collect NDC numbers from providers to enable rebate collection on biologics and other physician-administered drugs in Medicaid.

This year, state Medicaid agencies must require providers to submit claims for single source, physician-administered drugs using HCPCS codes or NDC numbers that allow states to bill for rebates. Starting next year, states must require providers to submit claims for single source physician-administered drugs and 20 Secretary-specified, multiple source physician-administered drugs using NDC numbers. States that require additional time to comply may ask for a hardship waiver.

Normally, $15 million a year doesn't buy you much in the federal government. A notable exception is the Effective Health Care Program at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Drug manufacturers, device makers, health plans, state Medicaid agencies, Wall Street analysts, physicians, and patient groups should all follow it closely.

The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) authorized AHRQ to conduct and support research on outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals, devices, and health care services. With a modest budget, a tiny but dedicated staff, and partnerships with top research institutions, AHRQ's Effective Health Care Program involves three approaches to research the comparative effectiveness of different medical treatments, drug therapies, and clinical practices:

1. Review and Synthesize Knowledge: AHRQ's network of 12 Evidence-based Practice Centers systematically review published and unpublished scientific evidence on what is known. Given the huge volume of studies and journal articles produced every year, it is next to impossible for providers, payors, and other key decision makers to keep up and even harder for them to thoughtfully weigh the evidence. AHRQ and its research partners synthesize the science and build a meaningful evidence base.

2. Promote and Generate New Knowledge: The DEcIDE Research Network studies new scientific evidence and analytic tools in an accelerated and practical format. DEcIDE stands for "Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness." Comprised of 13 university research centers and think tanks, the DEcIDE network conducts accelerated practical studies about the comparative clinical effectiveness, safety, and appropriateness of specific health care services, drugs, and devices. In other words, what works best for patients.

3. Compile Findings and Translate and Disseminate Knowledge to Decision Makers: AHRQ's John M. Eisenberg Clinical Decisions and Communications Science Center takes the research results and transform them into into a variety of useful, actionable formats for stakeholders (e.g., providers, payors, purchasers, patients, manufacturers). Specifically, these include (a) consumer guides (short summaries of health care research that can help with decisions about treatments), (b) clinician guides (brief evidence summaries to assist clinical decision making), (c) policymaker guides (short reports of research evidence for use in health care policy making), and (d) white papers on state-of-the-art concepts in health communication.

The past couple years, the initiative has focused on ten priority health care conditions, selected because of their high impact on Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other federal health programs:

Later this year, AHRQ will entertain nominations for other priority conditions.

Here's a sampling of the excellent work already generated. For a directory of these reports, with free access in PDF format, click here:

The Effective Health Care Program has 40 other reports in the works, covering a wide range of topics. These include more comparative effectiveness reviews of specific drugs as well as tools to measure quality, reduce errors, and monitor therapies. To get notified when new research becomes available, sign up for AHRQ's email list.

In health policy, bad ideas never go away. Case in point is the proposal in California to require that health plans spend at least 85% of premium revenue on provider payments. Specifically, as part of his $12 billion Stay Healthy California package of reforms, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposes to set a new minimum medical loss ratio for health plans.

In a nutshell, a health insurer's medical loss ratio (MLR) is an accounting construct and relative differences from one health plan to another has absolutely nothing to do with affordability of premiums, access to care, quality of care, patient satisfaction, adequacy of provider networks, or virtually anything else of interest to policy makers.

Further, it is based on a staggering array of faulty assumptions about health care delivery, insurance markets, and the uninsured, and ignorance of the difference between price and value. And artificial medical loss ratio standards result in many unintended consequences, including less competition, fewer consumer options, pushing more people into taxpayer-financed Medicaid and SCHIP, and restricting resources needed to improve quality and reduce medical errors.

Jamie Robinson, Ph.D., professor of economics and chair of the health policy program at the University of California, Berkeley, put it best in a definitive article in Health Affairs:

The medical loss ratio is an accounting monstrosity that enthralls the unsophisticated observer and distorts the policy discourse.

Juxtaposition of low medical loss ratio with forprofit status has fed the flames of HMO bashing but is completely without substance.

Thanks to the hard work of Secretary Kim Belshe and her excellent team, Governor Schwarzenegger's health reform initiative has many components worthy of serious consideration. However, further regulation of medical loss ratios - a long discredited idea that will only hinder the Governor's coverage objectives - is not one of them.

In health care, states serve as the nation's laboratories of reform - able to test innovations in financing, coverage, regulation, and care delivery. In 2007, states are leading the way on health insurance coverage expansion, leveraging a mix of policies including universal coverage, individual mandates, tax credits and Section 125 plans, and insurance "exchanges" or "connectors" to facilitate buying of affordable health plans.

Because so much is going on and since I do a fair amount of workin this area, several readers of the Piper Report asked me to post some resources on what's going on in the states. So here you go.

State Health Reform Commissions:

Several states have created task forces or study committees to examine options for coverage expansion and make recommendations. Most are appointed by the governor or governor and legislative leaders. A few are special committees of the legislature. Here are states with health reform commissions:

Governors' Health Care Reform Initiatives:

Several governors have announced detailed health reform proposals. Most focus largely or entirely on coverage expansion but several also thankfully include initiatives to improve quality of care, combat medical errors, and/or increase transparency of provider prices and performance.

More Resources on State-Based Health Reform:

Massachusetts, of course, started the ball rolling with its groundbreaking, bipartisan reform initiative in 2006. To learn more, here's an excellent article from BNA's Health Policy Report on the impact of Massachusetts health reform on coverage expansion efforts in others states (PDF).

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) maintains a helpful list of legislative bills on universal coverage proposed in states.

For the best books on health reform, Medicaid, and other hot topics in health care, please visit my book recommendations.

For latest state-specific data on health care coverage and spending, check out the free, easy-to-use tools on StateHealthFacts.org.

Questions on State Health Reform:

Feel free to contact me if you have questions on what's going on in the states.

When asked about health care innovations, especially practices directed at controlling costs, most policymakers and wonks point to private sector solutions, such as the cost-constraining effects of HMOs in the 1990's or today's ideation of consumer-directed health plans. But is this conventional wisdom wrong? What about public sector health policies, most notably in Medicare or Medicaid?

In a fascinating new book, two top thought leaders show how a powerful and complex Medicare payment formula led to fundamental changes across the health care system, facilitating a dramatic power shift from providers (hospitals and physicians) to buyers (Medicare, Medicaid, and employers).

Influence of Medicare PPS on U.S. Health System:

In Medicare Prospective Payment and the Shaping of U.S. Health Care, Rick Mayes, Ph.D. and Robert A. Berenson, M.D. describe how Medicare's transformation from retrospective, cost-based payment methods to prospective payment systems (PPS) "both initiated and repeatedly intensified the economic restructuring of the U.S. health care system." In addition to providing a thoughtful history of Medicare PPS from a research concept to the single most powerful financial driver in health care, Drs. Mayes and Berenson make the case that the public sector has been the major innovator.

In building their case and exploring how PPS works in the real world, they interviewed 65 health financing experts, including several former CMS administrators. Bob Berenson and Rick Mayes do a nice job challenging conventional wisdom, which in health policy is always a good thing.

Earlier in my career, I cut my teeth on PPS at the White House Office of Management and Budget, where my scope included Medicare Part A and hospital reimbursement policy. Therefore, for me, Medicare Prospective Payment and the Shaping of U.S. Health Care made for a particularly intriguing read. But you don't need to be a Medicare wonk to understand and benefit from this crisp, well-written book.

Prospective Payment Systems in a Nutshell:

Old style cost-based or retrospective systems are inherently inflationary, reward inefficient providers, and reimburse largely for factors unrelated to the patient. In a nutshell, prospective payment is based on reimbursing health care providers for factors outside their control - notably the diagnosis and other relevant characteristics of the patient and outside, industry-wide factors like inflation and geographic variation in wage rates.

Under a prospective payment system (PPS), a provider receives a fixed payment to cover an episode of care during a period of time. The payment formulas are highly complex, with many adjustments to address everything from outliers, teaching-related costs, and uncompensated care to more purely political issues. The idea is to set the bundled, prospective payment on what it costs an efficient provider to serve the patient. The efficient players make money; the inefficient lose money.

Every year, rates are modified to reflect inflation or technical refinements. However, annual increases are often driven by federal budget constraints or attempts to moderate provider profit margins. Also, because PPS is about promoting economic efficiency, payments have little to do with quality of care or patient safety - hence, recent interest in adding elements of Pay for Performance (P4P) into the system.

Medicare began using the PPS approach for inpatient hospital services in 1983-84. Through a series of Congressional changes, PPS-based approaches are now used in Medicare to pay outpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and hospice organizations. While each provider type has its own kind of prospective payment method, the concept is the same. Prospective payment is also used heavily by state Medicaid programs and employer-sponsored health plans.

With sound, furry, and a fair quota of sound bites and photo opps, House Democrats are pushing for quick adoption of H.R. 4, the Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2007. The bill would require the Secretary of HHS to negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers on drug prices in Medicare Part D.

As I explained in an earlier post, federal drug price negotiations would not generate savings above what are already achieved via the marketplace - unless Congress wants to severely limit the number of new and existing drugs available to seniors. However, the conclusion is counter intuitive to the uninitiated, especially given media hype and partisan palaver.

Today, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) told Rep. John Dingell, new Ways and Means Committee chairman, that federal drug price negotiations under H.R. 4 would save nothing. Here are the salient points of CBO's official estimate:

CBO estimates that H.R. 4 would have a negligible effect on federal spending because we anticipate that the Secretary would be unable to negotiate prices across the broad range of covered Part D drugs that are more favorable than those obtained by PDPs under current law. Since the legislation specifically directs the Secretary to negotiate only about the prices that could be charged to PDPs, and explicitly indicates that the Secretary would not have authority to negotiate about some other factors that may influence the prescription drug market, we assume that the negotiations would be limited solely to a discussion about the prices to be charged to PDPs. In that context, the Secretary's ability to influence the outcome of those negotiations would be limited. For example, without the authority to establish a formulary, we believe that the Secretary would not be able to encourage the use of particular drugs by Part D beneficiaries, and as a result would lack the leverage to obtain significant discounts in his negotiations with drug manufacturers.

Instead, prices for covered Part D drugs would continue to be determined through negotiations between drug manufacturers and PDPs. Under current law, PDPs are allowed to establish formularies - subject to certain limits - and thus have some ability to direct demand to drugs produced by one manufacturer rather than another. The PDPs also bear substantial financial risk and therefore have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts in order to control their costs and offer coverage that attracts enrollees through features such as low premiums and cost-sharing requirements. Therefore, the PDPs have both the incentives and the tools to negotiate drug prices that the government, under the legislation, would not have. H.R. 4 would not alter that essential dynamic.

To read CBO's letter to Chairman Dingell, click here (PDF). To learn more about the issue, please check out my earlier story.

The federal False Claims Act has been an effective tool in combating fraud and abuse in government programs, particularly Medicare. Several states have their own state versions of false claims legislation. The federal Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), enacted last February, gives states a powerful new financial incentive to enact state false claims acts modeled after the federal version and directed at fighting Medicaid fraud and abuse.

Specifically, states with state false claims acts that meet certain federal standards are able to keep more of whatever is recovered from fraudulent Medicaid providers or suppliers. The incentive amounts to ten percentage points of any recovery. For example, if a state has a 50% federal Medicaid match, it would normally have to return to the feds 50% of anything recovered. However, if the state has a federally compliant false claims act, the state gets to keep 60% or a 10 percentage point jump in its share. For most states, this could easily result in millions of dollars kept in the state.

OIG Review of State False Claims Acts:

Under the DRA, the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for looking at state false claims laws (whether new, existing, or amended) to see if they meet the federal standard and therefore if the state gets the incentive. To read the OIG's review guidelines, click here.

So far, at the request of state officials, the OIG has looked at existing statutes in ten states: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas. According to the OIG, the state false claims statutes in Illinois, Massachusetts, and Tennessee meet the DRA requirements and therefore these states' Medicaid programs may keep more of any Medicaid recoveries. The other states will need to amend their statutes if they wish to qualify for financial incentive.

Background on Federal False Claims Act:

Since the nation's founding, federal law has permitted private citizens to sue on behalf of the government to combat fraud in public programs. If the fraud or false claim is proven in court, the citizen bringing the suit gets to keep a portion of the funds recovered as an incentive.

Today, fraud fighters and whistleblowers use the federal False Claims Act, which was enacted in 1863 to stop fraud by military suppliers to the Union Army. Revised several times by Congress, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) has been increasingly used to bring lawsuits against health care providers and suppliers.

Of course, federal prosecutors may also bring criminal charges but in criminal cases they must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil cases are much easier to win in the complex world of health care claims since the standard is a preponderance of the evidence.

How the False Claims Act Works:

Under the False Claims Act, a person with knowledge of fraud against the U.S. government may file a civil suit on behalf of the government against the person or business that allegedly committed the fraud. These are referred to qui tam cases. "Qui tam" (pronounced "key tam" or "kwee tam" and Latin for "who as well") is used in short for longer Latin phrase meaning "he who (sues) for the king as well as for himself." (Okay, for Latin buffs, it's qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipse. Now you know why everybody just says Qui Tam.)

Qui tam lawsuits are first filed with the federal district court in secret, to give the U.S. Justice Department time to decide whether to intervene and take over prosecuting the case itself. DOJ takes on about a quarter of these cases. If DOJ decides not to take the case, the qui tam plaintiff or "relator" - who is often an internal whistleblower since they need to be the source of information in the case - may pursue the case on behalf of the federal government but at his or her own expense. However, unlike other civil actions where a person can represent themselves (unwise but possible), the relator must hire an attorney to represent them.

The False Claims Act provides for treble damages. Therefore, if fraud is proven through the civil case, the defendant(s) are liable for three times the original cost of the fraud to the taxpayers - plus civil fines of $5,000 to $10,000 for each instance of fraud or false claim.

The amount received by a successful qui tam plaintiff depends on whether the DOJ took the case. If the Justice Department takes the case, the qui tam plaintiff gets between 15% and 25% of the recovery. If the Justice Department declines to take the case and the relator pursues the civil suit on their own, the qui tam plaintiff receives 25% to 30% of the recovery.

Given the size of some of these incentives, the Justice Department often balks and tries to get them reduced, arguing that the plaintiff lacked the direct knowledge required to qualify. Therefore, the payouts to successful whistleblowers often lead to legal battles long after the fraud is proven and defendants pay up.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in just such a case where the federal government was challenging the right of a successful qui tam plaintiff to collect a portion of recoveries. The ruling, expected by this summer, could have a major impact on future qui tam suits.

Please check out my previous posts on Medicaid program integrity issues.

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made a series of significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing, Medicaid best price rebates, and Medicaid payments to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The new policies, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, create major challenges to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies.

DRA Drug Pricing Changes in a Nutshell:

While the DRA has many moving parts, in general the new policies will:

1. Drive more Medicaid drug spending toward generics and reduce the market advantages of authorized generics.

2. Make Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) - a key measure of drug prices in the marketplace and the metric used in determining Medicaid rebates - transparent to the public. Previously, AMP was confidential and known only to government officials.

3. Lower AMP on many prescription drugs, putting drug makers under increased cost pressures and increasing Medicaid rebates to states.

4. Increase the compliance risks of drug manufacturers.

5. Reduce Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies.

6. Put another nail in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) by moving Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement systems from AWP to AMP.

Federal Proposed Rules:

Today, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released proposed rules on implementing the DRA drug pricing policies. Final rules are expected in June 2007.

However, because key provisions are effective on January 1, 2007, pharma companies must come into compliance based on incomplete guidance and be prepared to make major changes again this summer.

DRA Changes to Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price:

The law requires significant changes to how drug manufacturers calculate Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price (BP), reducing the market power of some key price concessions used by manufacturers:

Drug manufacturers must report AMP on a monthly basis starting January 2007. More importantly, average manufacturer prices on all drugs will publicly posted on CMS' website starting Spring 2007 after CMS resolves some data and systems issues. Previously, reporting was quarterly and confidential by law.

DRA also mandates significant changes to the federal upper payment limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs. The feds are widening the definition of what is a multiple source drug and setting FUL at 250% of AMP. Previously, FUL was set at 150% of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). This will further increase pricing pressure on brand drugs when generics are available.

Operational Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Industry:

The drug industry faces many practical, operational challenges in meeting the new requirements for 2007:

1. Incomplete federal guidance. Until the final rules arrive, the drug industry must implement the DRA changes with limited federal guidance. Key factors still unclear include class of trade designations, treatment of administrative and service fees, adjusting for lagged price concessions and returned goods, correcting and restating AMP, and a variety of baseline AMP issues.

2. Moving from quarterly to more complex monthly reporting, plus adjusting for each month's transactions.

3. Adapting data, systems, staff, and reporting to accommodate different pricing methodologies required by CMS. For example, calculating and reporting AMP under Medicaid vs. calculating and reporting Average Sales Price (ASP) under Medicare Part B.

Financial Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Companies:

The new DRA policies also pose significant financial challenges for pharma companies. For example:

Compliance Challenges of DRA for Drug Manufacturers:

The DRA changes present new or expanded compliance challenges for drug manufacturers. Given the frequency, changes, and overall complexity, there are many ways to inadvertently screw up federal reporting. Ensuring compliance will require heavy reliance on other parts of company and on external partners. Transparency of pricing will likely lead to new regulations, audits, and Congressional hearings. Finally, while over time DRA reporting may make it easier to defend against suits, companies should expect dramatic increase in whistleblower suits under federal and state False Claims Acts.

Learn More:

For the DRA statutory changes affecting drug pricing, click here (PDF).

For the proposed rule, click here (PDF). For CMS' fact sheet on the proposed rule, click here (PDF).

Read the OIG's recommendations to the HHS Secretary on DRA implementation issues. The OIG report includes useful background information.

For more information or a briefing, feel free to contact me.

There's a lot of truth in the old joke about the problem with Republicans and Democrats: Republicans need a heart and Democrats need a brain. As Democrats prepare to take control of Congress, they appear eager to prove the joke by pursuing legislation to require government "negotiations" on prescription drug prices in Medicare Part D.

The idea has emotional appeal, so let's see if there is any evidence to support the idea. (If you come from the Bumper Sticker School of Health Policy, stop here. The facts will only confuse you and don't easily make for emotive talking points.)

Non-Interference Requirement in MMA:

In the Medicare Moderation Act, the massive 2003 legislation that created the Medicare Part D drug benefit among other Medicare reforms, Congress prohibited the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from interfering with drug pricing in the competitive market. Part D prescription drug plans - Medicare Advantage drug plans (MA-PDs) and prescription drug plans (PDPs) - would battle among themselves to cut the best deals with pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies and openly compete for enrollees.

The statute at controversy, found at section 1860D-11(i) of the Social Security Act, is short and sweet:

(i) NONINTERFERENCE. In order to promote competition under this part and in carrying out this part, the Secretary:

(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and

(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.

Estimated Savings of Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Supporters of federal staff negotiating drug prices argue that it would generate billions of dollars in savings for taxpayers and seniors. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - the highly respected, non-partisan fiscal advisor to both houses of Congress and the agency that officially scores the cost and savings of all legislative proposals - agrees with top health economists and Medicare experts that federal price negotiations will save precisely zip.

Following passage of MMA, Senate leaders asked CBO to examine the effect of striking the 'noninterference' provision. CBO reported:

We estimate that striking that provision would have a negligible effect on federal spending because CBO estimates that substantial savings will be obtained by the private plans and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree. Because they will be at substantial financial risk, private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts, both to control their own costs in providing the drug benefit and to attract enrollees with low premiums and cost-sharing requirements.

CBO was then asked if the federal government could save anything if CMS centrally negotiated prices with makers of single-source drugs. (Single-source prescription drugs are brand-name drugs that have no generic equivalent on the market and are generally available from only one manufacturer.) Again, CBO concluded that savings are unlikely, unless of course federal officials are willing to play hardball and restrict patient access to therapeutically unique drugs until the manufacturers agree to government price demands:

Most single-source drugs face competition from other drugs that are therapeutic alternatives. CBO believes that there is little, if any, potential savings from negotiations involving those single-source drugs. We expect that risk-bearing private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts for such drugs and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree.

Nevertheless, there is potential for some savings if the Secretary were to have the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of single-source drugs that do not face competition from therapeutic alternatives. Private plans offering a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries will have less leverage in negotiating discounts for drugs without therapeutic alternatives than they have in price negotiations for drugs that do face such competition. (In that regard, the Medicare plans will be no different than private health plans that offer prescription drug coverage to other populations.)

Under current law, there already are significant pressures that limit the prices that manufacturers charge for drugs - whether those drugs face competition from therapeutic alternatives or not. Those pressures include the prospects that plans will not cover a drug (or will substantially limit the amount they pay for a drug) and that manufacturers will provoke a backlash (potentially including legislation) if they set prices too high. Moreover, the creation of the Medicare drug benefit has given federal officials greater opportunity and incentive than under prior law to bring pressure on manufacturers - for example, by influencing public opinion and policy makers--if the prices that manufacturers set for single-source drugs that are not subject to competition from therapeutic alternatives are perceived as being too high. Giving the Secretary an additional tool--the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of such drugs - would put greater pressure on those manufacturers and could produce some additional savings.

Ample Evidence Against Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Not only would federal price negotiations save little or nothing compared to the increasingly competitive private marketplace, there are host of other arguments against the idea.

In a fascinating new study - The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and Pharmaceutical Innovation - Benjamin Zycher, Ph.D., an economist and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Medical Progress, carefully "estimates the impact that federal negotiation of prescription drug prices would have on pharmaceutical research and development (R & D) investment through 2025."

Dr. Zycher concludes that, while federal price negotiations could save some Medicare dollars, "the longer-term human costs of government price-negotiation...are likely to be large and adverse." Most notably, the data show government mandated negotiations would dramatically reduce the development of new, life-saving drugs (about a dozen annually), resulting in "...a loss of 5 million expected life-years annually, an adverse effect that can be valued conservatively at about $500 billion per year, an amount far in excess of total annual U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals."

In Compromising Quality: The High Cost of Government Drug Purchasing, Edmund F. Haislmaier provides a crisp, devastating critique of the idea of federal drug price negotiations. He disects the core myths and outlines how it would only serve to threaten quality and access.

Proponents of government price negotiations assume that Medicare has more bargaining leverage than the private sector. In Why the New Congress Should Not Fix Drug Prices, researcher Greg D'Angelo does a nice job dismantling this faulty assumption.

Wait, It Gets Worse:

Many advocates of federal negotiations point to the VA's prescription drug program as an example of how to reduce drug prices. As I have explained to many audiences, comparing the VA approach to Medicare Part D is not even an apples to oranges comparison. It's more like comparing apples and poodles - and makes as much sense.

A groundbreaking study, by Frank R. Lichtenberg, Ph.D. of the Columbia School of Business, should put such comparisons to rest. In Older Drugs, Shorter Lives? An Examination of the Health Effects of the Veterans Health Administration Formulary, Dr. Lichtenberg shows the VH approach is not about prices or genuine negotiations. With the VA's tight budget, it is all about restricting veterans' access to new (and many old) medications to save dollars and hit budget targets.

The VA's highly restrictive national formulary excludes 62% of drugs approved by the FDA during the 1990's and 81% of new medications approved since 2000. Even worse, the drug benefit designed for our nation's veterans does not pay for a staggering 78% of new, high-priority prescription drugs approved by the FDA on an expedited basis since 1997 because of their life-saving impact. By comparison, commercial health plans, Medicare Part D drug plans, and state Medicaid programs cover the vast majority of new drugs and move quick to add coverage for most drugs given fast-track by the FDA.

Dr. Lichtenberg's 2005 study shows that the VA's prescription drug system - seen by many as the "model" for Medicare Part D - reduced the life span and survival rates of vets since its 1997 introduction. Note to Congress: Death is always cheaper than life but rarely preferable.

Recap:

So, let's recap. Even putting aside the dangers of a massive increase in government power, fact it would dramatically reduce consumer and physician decision making, fact it would shift costs to other payors, and fact it would inevitably lead to economically disastrous price controls, the federal government negotiating drug prices will likely save little or nothing - unless Congress wants to severely restrict patient access to new and existing medications, thereby shortening lives, reducing quality of life, and increasing costs well beyond any savings. And that's if it's even feasible for CMS to do it. Trust me, it's not.

The Bush Administration remains intent on issuing new regulations to implement several Medicaid budget cuts proposed in the President's FY 2007 budget last February. Most notably, the Administration wants to reduce state use of provider taxes by capping assessments at three percent, instead of the current six percent. This c