The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) - the influential independent Congressional agency charged with advising Congress on a wide range of Medicare policy issues - has released its Medicare payment policy recommendations for 2009. The 355-page report includes a weath of information for those tracking Medicare provider or health plan issues, particularly annual provider payment updates, reforms to Medicare Advantage, and quality incentives.

In summary, here are MedPAC's recommendations to Congress:

Hospital Inpatient and Outpatient Services:

Physician Services:

Outpatient Dialysis Services:

Skilled Nursing Facility Services:

Home Health Services:

Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Services:

Long-Term Care Hospital Services:

Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans:

Part D Enrollment, Benefit Offerings, and Drug Plan Payments:

Medicare Savings Programs and Part D Low-Income Drug Subsidy:

To read the full MedPAC report, click here (large PDF file).

Enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans has jumped 63 percent since 2005. Over 22 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries - 8.8 million total - now receive their Medicare Part A and Part B benefits through a private health plan instead of the traditional fee-for-service system. About 88 percent of all Medicare Advantage plan enrollees also receive their Part D drug benefits from the same health plan (as part of a MA-PD).

A new analysis confirms that Medicare Advantage plans provide significantly more health benefits and lower cost sharing than traditional fee-for-service (FFS). The value-added of health plan enrollment is greatest for Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the genuinely managed care options, notably HMOs, PPOs, and Special Needs Plans (SNPs). The 20 percent of Medicare Advantage enrollees in relatively unmanaged Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS) plans receive extra benefits compared to the government-run traditional fee-for-service system. However, the HMO, PPO, and SNP options provide substantially more benefits and lower cost sharing than the PFFS model plans. The PFFS plans, which are controversial on Capitol Hill, typically operate only in rural areas.

To sum up, in terms of extra benefits for Medicare beneficiaries, Medicare Advantage plans using the HMO, PPO, or SNP models are superior to both traditional fee-for-service and PFFS plans. The PFFS plans are superior to traditional fee-for-service, at least in terms of extra benefits and cost sharing.

To read the issue brief - by Mark Merlis and sponsored by the Kaiser Family Foundation - click here (opens as a PDF).

To learn more, please check out my other posts on Medicare and Medicare Advantage issues.

More purchasers and payors are moving away from simplistic cost-driven drug benefit designs to formularies and cost sharing based on value. The impact of value-based drug benefit designs on manufacturers will depend on how quickly individual firms adapt their business thinking and communications strategies.

Until recently, the path to success for a drug manufacturer was based largely on product novelty, physician-centric marketing, and revenue strategies balancing unit prices and concessions against formulary position.

To maximize market share and margins in the world of value-based drug benefit designs, drug manufacturers will need to:

(1) Demonstrate the clinical and economic case for each product and each therapeutic class with an indication,

(2) Build absolute and comparative evidence on a continuous basis,

(3) Develop new value-based pricing models and market partnerships, and

(4) Communicate far more effectively with public and private payors.

For many firms, this will require a significant, even scary change in thinking and tactics; payor-centric communications; comfort with a massive increase in transparency; and a greater willingness to partner. Therefore, while the financial risks of moving to a value-based world are daunting, ultimately the greatest challenges are intellectual.

Value-based drug benefit designs will pose the greatest challenges to manufacturers with product lines (or pipelines) dominated "me too" drugs; rigid, risk-adverse organizational silos; and out-dated, prescriber-centric communications.

The journal Medical Care has published series of outstanding articles on emerging methods and tools to compare the effectiveness of medical therapies, prescription drugs, and devices. The peer-reviewed articles are an outgrowth from a symposium on comparative effectiveness research sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).

Here are links to the individual articles in PDF format:

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the savvy nonpartisan shop that advises Congress on Medicare program issues, has updated its excellent series of primers. Extremely complex and changing constantly, Medicare payment policy will drive $479 billion in health spending in 2008. MedPAC's primers, typically four crisply-written pages, explain the basic steps and methodologies Medicare uses to reimburse fee-for-service providers, Medicare Advantage plans, and Medicare prescription drug plans.

Here are MedPAC's updated primers on the basics of Medicare reimbursement policy (click on links to open in PDF format):

Medicare Hospital Reimbursement:

Medicare Post-Acute Provider Reimbursement:

Medicare Physician Reimbursement:

Medicare Managed Care (Part C and Part D):

Other Medicare Reimbursement Policies:

The well-regarded industry trade journal Biotechnology Healthcare has an excellent article by Patrick Mullen on The Arrival of Average Sales Price. In it, Mr. Mullen interviews several top industry experts (yes, including me) on the rationale for and impact of Average Sales Price (ASP) and how health plans are following Medicare's lead:

Health plans are beginning to adopt the average sales price method of paying oncologists and other specialists for office-administered drugs. ASP is more transparent and has a smaller markup than its much maligned predecessor, average wholesale price. The speed of ASP uptake will affect everyone who makes, sells, prescribes, and takes these medications.

Average Sales Price and Drug Reimbursement:

In 2005, as part of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), the way Medicare Part B reimbursed physicians and clinics for biologics and other physician-administered injectable drugs changed fundamentally. Medicare Part B, the nation's largest payor of injectable drugs, started using Average Sales Price (ASP) to base payments for most drug products covered by Part B fee-for-service.

Using a new, tighter, and more accurate definition of ASP, drug manufacturers must report the Average Sales Price of each of their products. CMS, through its Part B claims processing contractors, reimburses physicians for covered drug products administered to Medicare benies at 106% of ASP, adjusted for volume.

Wide Ranging Impact of ASP in Marketplace:

Physician offices, particularly oncologists, have seen significant drops in Medicare revenue. While the impact on drug makers is mixed, overall the switch to ASP has tightened profit margins and required many manufacturers to revise projections.

Also, like the move of Medicaid to a new and publicly reported version of Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), the ASP reforms are another way drug prices are becoming transparent and flatter or less variable. The transformative effect on business practices and strategy should not be underestimated.

For Medicare Part B, the switch to ASP-based payment has saved billions of dollars and dramatically slowed the growth in Part B prescription drug spending. Beneficiaries have benefited as well, since they are paying the 20% Part B copay on lower prices. However, there is some evidence that some docs are switching drug therapies (which may or may not be clinically optimal for patients) or forcing patients to receive injections from other settings, such as outpatient hospitals. The behavioral effect on physician practices is still hard to discern beyond the realm of anecdote but is something worth monitoring closely, especially in light of low Medicare rates for professional fees.

To Learn More About ASP:

In addition to the article in Biotechnology Healthcare mentioned above, here are some MedPAC resources to understand ASP, Medicare spending on drugs and biologics, and Medicare reimbursement of physician services:

Kerry Weems, Secretary Mike Leavitt's deputy chief of staff and President Bush's nominee to head the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), faces tough Senate confirmation hearings in July. A savvy, career HHS insider with a wealth of experience in the fiscal and organizational mechanics of federal health programs, Mr. Weems is a good choice for an administrator to steer CMS in the last 18 months of the Bush Administration. But he nonetheless faces several serious challenges during the confirmation process. A few examples:

1. Efforts to Hold Confirmation Hostage to Policy Commitments:

Senators, trade groups, and advocates of all flavors have long policy wish lists. As FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D. can attest, the confirmation process - in committee and on the Senate floor - is a unique opportunity for Democrats and even some Republicans to hold up confirmation until the nominee or Department concedes to certain policy demands. And the wish lists for the FDA are nothing compared to what many want from CMS.

2. A Maze of Medicare and Medicaid Controversies:

For better or worse, a wide range of delicate issues at CMS were left unexamined during Republican control of Congress. The Democrats now in charge of the Hill are eager to make political hay with health issues, reshape policy, and give their core constituencies a crack, albeit by proxy, at challenging CMS actions in a public forum.

Regardless of the Administration or the party running the Executive Branch, Medicare and Medicaid are full of dirty little secrets, some real and some imagined, intertwined within a massive level of complexity prone to misconception and manipulation by political foes and those of varying motivations eager for a larger slice of an $800 billion+ pie. Many critics of CMS see the Weems nomination hearings and floor debate as a unique opportunity.

3. Nomination of a Non-Wonk:

While Kerry Weems has a lot going for him and CMS would likely benefit from leadership by a career insider, he is not a health policy wonk. That is, he is not a academic, researcher, health policy maker, or lobbyist (not that most lobbyists are mavens but they like playing them on TV). He's a budget and finance guy and a career one at that. Not a bad thing at all, but a potential problem in a town that grossly overvalues what MD's and PhD's typically know about health policy or finance and sees "budget guys" in health programs as somehow being on a first name basis with the devil.

Some advocacy groups, who naturally have the ear of Dems in the Senate, are concerned that Mr. Weems lacks the requisite substantive expertise in Medicare or Medicaid policy (well, make that Medicare, since unfortunately few inside the Beltway understand or track Medicaid). When a Republican is in charge of the White House, Dems and advocates are much more comfortable with an academic running CMS. And when a Democrat is in charge, they virtually insist on it. In its 30-year history, CMS (formerly named HCFA) has had nearly as many administrators and acting administrators. Add to this extremely high turnover the fact that CMS is rather unique in having a tiny number of political appointees.

There are notable exceptions. Gail Wilensky, Ph.D., one of the nation's most talented health policy experts, turned out to be an excellent administrator in the early 1990's. And there have been times where the agency was led by a budget guy, most notably Leonard Schaeffer, who ran HCFA is its early days. He came to HCFA from managing health budgets for the State of Illinois and later was the founding chairman and CEO of WellPoint.

Kerry Weems will have his hands full next month. But he's a smart fellow, with a keen sense for detail, and HHS and CMS staffs are briefing him around the clock in preparation. He'll do well before the Senate if given a fair shake.

As they move corporate resources from sales to R&D and attempt to adapt to new business dynamics, pharma and biotech companies must become far smarter in building the case for coverage and reimbursement. Increasingly, drug makers are understanding the need to build the case early in drug discovery and development, demonstrate the value proposition, and effectively communicate - or even partner - with payors (health plans, drug plans, PBMs) and purchasers (Medicare, Medicaid, employers).

To learn more, please listen to Mark Senak's latest podcast. In it, I briefly explain the need to build value-driven, payor-friendly cases for drug coverage and reimbursement and to do so early.

Eye on FDA is Mark Senak's popular blog on drug industry regulation, the FDA, and strategic communications strategies. In addition to providing thoughtful analyses and useful resources in his blog, Mark also podcasts interviews with industry executives, FDA officials, and top thought leaders.

The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 (reintroduced as Senate Bill 484), sponsored by Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) and co-sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), is worth watching as the new Congress contemplates pharmaceutical industry legislation.

As proposed, The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 has five components:

1. Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require an application for approval for a new drug or biological product to include a proposed Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). Designed to be an integrated, flexible mechanism to acquire and adapt to new safety information about a drug, REMS would require (a) labeling for the drug for use by health care providers; (b) submission of reports for the drug; and (c) a statement as to whether the analysis and surveillance are sufficient to assess the serious risks of the drug. REMS is modeled after the risk management approach taken by the European Union.

2. Establishes a Drug Safety Oversight Board.

3. Requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the Reagan-Udall Institute for Applied Biomedical Research as a nonprofit corporation to advance the Critical Path Initiative to modernize medical product development, accelerate innovation, and enhance product safety. Requires the Institute to have a Board of Directors. Allows the Board to coordinate and collaborate with other entities to conduct research, education, and outreach and to modernize the sciences of developing, manufacturing, and evaluating the safety and effectiveness of diagnostics, devices, biologics, and drugs.

4. Amends the Public Health Service Act to require the Secretary, acting through the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to establish and administer a clinical trial registry database and a clinical trial results database. Requires a responsible party for a clinical trial to submit clinical trial information to the NIH Director for inclusion in the databases.

5. Requires each individual under consideration for a term on an FDA advisory committee providing advice or recommendations to the Secretary regarding FDA activities to disclose industry financial interests.

To learn more, check out the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions' hearing on the bill.

Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of Biotech

Summary: Why has the biotechnology industry failed to perform up to expectations - despite all its promise? In Science Business, Gary P. Pisano, Ph.D. answers this question by providing an incisive critique of the industry. Dr. Pisano not only reveals the underlying causes of biotech's problems; he offers the most sophisticated analysis yet on how the industry works. And he provides clear prescriptions for companies, investors, and policymakers seeking ways to improve the industry's performance. According to Dr. Pisano, the biotech industry's problems stem from its special character as a science-based business. This character poses three unique business challenges: (1) how to finance highly risky investments under profound uncertainty and long time horizons for R&D, (2) how to learn rapidly enough to keep pace with advances in drug science knowledge, and (3) how to integrate capabilities across a broad spectrum of scientific and technological knowledge bases.

The Business of Healthcare Innovation

Summary: Robert Lawton Burns, Ph.D., MBA focuses on the key role of the 'producers' as the main source of innovation in this wide-ranging analysis of business trends in the manufacturing branch of the health care industry. Written by industry academics and executives, the book provides a detailed overview of the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, genomics / proteomics, medical device, and information technology sectors. Most importantly, it describes the growing convergence between these sectors and the need for executives in one sector to increasingly draw upon trends in the others.

Overdose: How Excessive Government Regulation Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation

Summary: This book is the first to offer a comprehensive examination of the pharmaceutical industry by following the tortuous course of a new drug as it progresses from early development to final delivery. Richard A. Epstein looks closely at the regulatory framework that surrounds all aspects of making pharmaceutical products today, and he assesses which current legal and regulatory practices make sense and which have gone awry. While critics of pharmaceutical companies call for ever more stringent controls on virtually every aspect of drug development and approval, Professor Epstein cautions that the effect of such an approach will be to stifle pharmaceutical innovation and slow the delivery of beneficial treatments to the patients who need them.

The New Medicines: How Drugs are Created, Approved, Marketed, and Sold

Today, most people use prescription medications. Every year, the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry produces new medicines that treat everything from arthritis to AIDS, from high cholesterol to depression. But, despite recent controversies regarding the safety of drugs, consumers know little about the medications that they ingest and inject. How are these new medicines invented? How do consumers know that drugs are safe and effective? How are they tested? Who regulates their production - and who watches the regulators? How do drug companies produce the vast quantities needed for the marketplace, and why do they market their drugs as they do? The New Medicines (by Bernice Schacter, Ph.D.) leads the reader through the maze of the modern drug industry - from bench to bedside - and provides consumers with a step-by-step understanding of how new medicines are created, approved, marketed, and sold.

Inside the FDA: The Business and Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat

Because of the importance of what it regulates, the FDA comes under tremendous political, industry, and consumer pressure. But the pressure goes far beyond the ordinary lobbying of Washington trade groups. Its mandate - one quarter of the national economy - brings the FDA into the middle of some of the most important and contentious issues of modern society. From "designer" babies and abortion to the price of prescription drugs and the role of government itself, Inside the FDA takes readers on an intriguing journey into the world of today's most powerful consumer agency. In a time when companies continue to accuse the FDA of nitpicking and needlessly delaying needed new drugs, and consumers are convinced that the agency bends to industry pressure by rushing unsafe drugs to market, Inside the FDA digs deep to reveal the truth. Through scores of interviews and real-world stories, author Fran Hawthorne (senior contributing editor of Institutional Investor) also shows how and why the agency makes some of its most controversial decisions as well as how its recent reaction to certain issues - including the revolutionary cancer drug Erbitux, stem cell research, and bioengineering of food - may jeopardize its ability to keep up with future scientific developments.

More Excellent Books on Pharma and Biotech:

For additional reading on the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, and prescription drug issues, please check out my recommended reading lists:

Best Blog on FDA and Pharma Industry Communications:

For insightful, industry-savvy advice on the FDA, drug regulation, and pharma strategic communications, please visit Eye on FDA - the excellent blog by my friend and colleague Mark Senak, JD, senior vice president at Fleishman-Hillard.

With sound, furry, and a fair quota of sound bites and photo opps, House Democrats are pushing for quick adoption of H.R. 4, the Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2007. The bill would require the Secretary of HHS to negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers on drug prices in Medicare Part D.

As I explained in an earlier post, federal drug price negotiations would not generate savings above what are already achieved via the marketplace - unless Congress wants to severely limit the number of new and existing drugs available to seniors. However, the conclusion is counter intuitive to the uninitiated, especially given media hype and partisan palaver.

Today, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) told Rep. John Dingell, new Ways and Means Committee chairman, that federal drug price negotiations under H.R. 4 would save nothing. Here are the salient points of CBO's official estimate:

CBO estimates that H.R. 4 would have a negligible effect on federal spending because we anticipate that the Secretary would be unable to negotiate prices across the broad range of covered Part D drugs that are more favorable than those obtained by PDPs under current law. Since the legislation specifically directs the Secretary to negotiate only about the prices that could be charged to PDPs, and explicitly indicates that the Secretary would not have authority to negotiate about some other factors that may influence the prescription drug market, we assume that the negotiations would be limited solely to a discussion about the prices to be charged to PDPs. In that context, the Secretary's ability to influence the outcome of those negotiations would be limited. For example, without the authority to establish a formulary, we believe that the Secretary would not be able to encourage the use of particular drugs by Part D beneficiaries, and as a result would lack the leverage to obtain significant discounts in his negotiations with drug manufacturers.

Instead, prices for covered Part D drugs would continue to be determined through negotiations between drug manufacturers and PDPs. Under current law, PDPs are allowed to establish formularies - subject to certain limits - and thus have some ability to direct demand to drugs produced by one manufacturer rather than another. The PDPs also bear substantial financial risk and therefore have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts in order to control their costs and offer coverage that attracts enrollees through features such as low premiums and cost-sharing requirements. Therefore, the PDPs have both the incentives and the tools to negotiate drug prices that the government, under the legislation, would not have. H.R. 4 would not alter that essential dynamic.

To read CBO's letter to Chairman Dingell, click here (PDF). To learn more about the issue, please check out my earlier story.

Medicare is a study in contrasts. In its financing, the program is modeled as what health wonks call "social insurance," which in reality is a euphemism for a politically effective but fiscally troubling mix of social welfare, health insurance, and cross-generational income transfers. Limited in coverage, slow to add coverage of new technologies, and often high in cost sharing, Medicare often cost-shifts to state Medicaid programs. While relatively cheap for the government to administer, Medicare is astonishingly complex, placing providers, supplies, health plans, and patients under a mountain of red tape.

In Medicare: A Policy Primer, Dr. Marilyn Moon - a respected researcher, former Medicare trustee, and one of the nation's leading Medicare policy gurus - "explains what Medicare is, how it works, and where is it headed." In this excellent introduction, Dr. Moon outlines the history of Medicare, taking readers from the program's origins in 1965 and the Great Society to today. The Medicare primer also walks readers through how the massive $370 billion program works in relation to the rest of the U.S. health care system and other federal programs.

While Dr. Moon is an unrepentant fan of Medicare and takes a decidedly Liberal, pro-entitlement approach to health policy, she takes pains to provide a thoughtful, balanced discussion of Medicare's key strengths and failings. She also debunks some lingering myths and assesses several of the more popular Medicare reform options.

Marilyn Moon, Ph.D. is currently vice president and director of the health program at the American Institutes for Research.

Published by Urban Institute Press, Medicare: A Policy Primer is available on Amazon.com here or direct from Urban Institute Press.

To learn more about Medicare, please check out my list of recommended Medicare books.

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made a series of significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing, Medicaid best price rebates, and Medicaid payments to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The new policies, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, create major challenges to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies.

DRA Drug Pricing Changes in a Nutshell:

While the DRA has many moving parts, in general the new policies will:

1. Drive more Medicaid drug spending toward generics and reduce the market advantages of authorized generics.

2. Make Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) - a key measure of drug prices in the marketplace and the metric used in determining Medicaid rebates - transparent to the public. Previously, AMP was confidential and known only to government officials.

3. Lower AMP on many prescription drugs, putting drug makers under increased cost pressures and increasing Medicaid rebates to states.

4. Increase the compliance risks of drug manufacturers.

5. Reduce Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies.

6. Put another nail in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) by moving Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement systems from AWP to AMP.

Federal Proposed Rules:

Today, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released proposed rules on implementing the DRA drug pricing policies. Final rules are expected in June 2007.

However, because key provisions are effective on January 1, 2007, pharma companies must come into compliance based on incomplete guidance and be prepared to make major changes again this summer.

DRA Changes to Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price:

The law requires significant changes to how drug manufacturers calculate Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price (BP), reducing the market power of some key price concessions used by manufacturers:

Drug manufacturers must report AMP on a monthly basis starting January 2007. More importantly, average manufacturer prices on all drugs will publicly posted on CMS' website starting Spring 2007 after CMS resolves some data and systems issues. Previously, reporting was quarterly and confidential by law.

DRA also mandates significant changes to the federal upper payment limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs. The feds are widening the definition of what is a multiple source drug and setting FUL at 250% of AMP. Previously, FUL was set at 150% of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). This will further increase pricing pressure on brand drugs when generics are available.

Operational Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Industry:

The drug industry faces many practical, operational challenges in meeting the new requirements for 2007:

1. Incomplete federal guidance. Until the final rules arrive, the drug industry must implement the DRA changes with limited federal guidance. Key factors still unclear include class of trade designations, treatment of administrative and service fees, adjusting for lagged price concessions and returned goods, correcting and restating AMP, and a variety of baseline AMP issues.

2. Moving from quarterly to more complex monthly reporting, plus adjusting for each month's transactions.

3. Adapting data, systems, staff, and reporting to accommodate different pricing methodologies required by CMS. For example, calculating and reporting AMP under Medicaid vs. calculating and reporting Average Sales Price (ASP) under Medicare Part B.

Financial Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Companies:

The new DRA policies also pose significant financial challenges for pharma companies. For example:

Compliance Challenges of DRA for Drug Manufacturers:

The DRA changes present new or expanded compliance challenges for drug manufacturers. Given the frequency, changes, and overall complexity, there are many ways to inadvertently screw up federal reporting. Ensuring compliance will require heavy reliance on other parts of company and on external partners. Transparency of pricing will likely lead to new regulations, audits, and Congressional hearings. Finally, while over time DRA reporting may make it easier to defend against suits, companies should expect dramatic increase in whistleblower suits under federal and state False Claims Acts.

Learn More:

For the DRA statutory changes affecting drug pricing, click here (PDF).

For the proposed rule, click here (PDF). For CMS' fact sheet on the proposed rule, click here (PDF).

Read the OIG's recommendations to the HHS Secretary on DRA implementation issues. The OIG report includes useful background information.

For more information or a briefing, feel free to contact me.

There's a lot of truth in the old joke about the problem with Republicans and Democrats: Republicans need a heart and Democrats need a brain. As Democrats prepare to take control of Congress, they appear eager to prove the joke by pursuing legislation to require government "negotiations" on prescription drug prices in Medicare Part D.

The idea has emotional appeal, so let's see if there is any evidence to support the idea. (If you come from the Bumper Sticker School of Health Policy, stop here. The facts will only confuse you and don't easily make for emotive talking points.)

Non-Interference Requirement in MMA:

In the Medicare Moderation Act, the massive 2003 legislation that created the Medicare Part D drug benefit among other Medicare reforms, Congress prohibited the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from interfering with drug pricing in the competitive market. Part D prescription drug plans - Medicare Advantage drug plans (MA-PDs) and prescription drug plans (PDPs) - would battle among themselves to cut the best deals with pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies and openly compete for enrollees.

The statute at controversy, found at section 1860D-11(i) of the Social Security Act, is short and sweet:

(i) NONINTERFERENCE. In order to promote competition under this part and in carrying out this part, the Secretary:

(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and

(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.

Estimated Savings of Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Supporters of federal staff negotiating drug prices argue that it would generate billions of dollars in savings for taxpayers and seniors. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - the highly respected, non-partisan fiscal advisor to both houses of Congress and the agency that officially scores the cost and savings of all legislative proposals - agrees with top health economists and Medicare experts that federal price negotiations will save precisely zip.

Following passage of MMA, Senate leaders asked CBO to examine the effect of striking the 'noninterference' provision. CBO reported:

We estimate that striking that provision would have a negligible effect on federal spending because CBO estimates that substantial savings will be obtained by the private plans and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree. Because they will be at substantial financial risk, private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts, both to control their own costs in providing the drug benefit and to attract enrollees with low premiums and cost-sharing requirements.

CBO was then asked if the federal government could save anything if CMS centrally negotiated prices with makers of single-source drugs. (Single-source prescription drugs are brand-name drugs that have no generic equivalent on the market and are generally available from only one manufacturer.) Again, CBO concluded that savings are unlikely, unless of course federal officials are willing to play hardball and restrict patient access to therapeutically unique drugs until the manufacturers agree to government price demands:

Most single-source drugs face competition from other drugs that are therapeutic alternatives. CBO believes that there is little, if any, potential savings from negotiations involving those single-source drugs. We expect that risk-bearing private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts for such drugs and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree.

Nevertheless, there is potential for some savings if the Secretary were to have the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of single-source drugs that do not face competition from therapeutic alternatives. Private plans offering a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries will have less leverage in negotiating discounts for drugs without therapeutic alternatives than they have in price negotiations for drugs that do face such competition. (In that regard, the Medicare plans will be no different than private health plans that offer prescription drug coverage to other populations.)

Under current law, there already are significant pressures that limit the prices that manufacturers charge for drugs - whether those drugs face competition from therapeutic alternatives or not. Those pressures include the prospects that plans will not cover a drug (or will substantially limit the amount they pay for a drug) and that manufacturers will provoke a backlash (potentially including legislation) if they set prices too high. Moreover, the creation of the Medicare drug benefit has given federal officials greater opportunity and incentive than under prior law to bring pressure on manufacturers - for example, by influencing public opinion and policy makers--if the prices that manufacturers set for single-source drugs that are not subject to competition from therapeutic alternatives are perceived as being too high. Giving the Secretary an additional tool--the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of such drugs - would put greater pressure on those manufacturers and could produce some additional savings.

Ample Evidence Against Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Not only would federal price negotiations save little or nothing compared to the increasingly competitive private marketplace, there are host of other arguments against the idea.

In a fascinating new study - The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and Pharmaceutical Innovation - Benjamin Zycher, Ph.D., an economist and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Medical Progress, carefully "estimates the impact that federal negotiation of prescription drug prices would have on pharmaceutical research and development (R & D) investment through 2025."

Dr. Zycher concludes that, while federal price negotiations could save some Medicare dollars, "the longer-term human costs of government price-negotiation...are likely to be large and adverse." Most notably, the data show government mandated negotiations would dramatically reduce the development of new, life-saving drugs (about a dozen annually), resulting in "...a loss of 5 million expected life-years annually, an adverse effect that can be valued conservatively at about $500 billion per year, an amount far in excess of total annual U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals."

In Compromising Quality: The High Cost of Government Drug Purchasing, Edmund F. Haislmaier provides a crisp, devastating critique of the idea of federal drug price negotiations. He disects the core myths and outlines how it would only serve to threaten quality and access.

Proponents of government price negotiations assume that Medicare has more bargaining leverage than the private sector. In Why the New Congress Should Not Fix Drug Prices, researcher Greg D'Angelo does a nice job dismantling this faulty assumption.

Wait, It Gets Worse:

Many advocates of federal negotiations point to the VA's prescription drug program as an example of how to reduce drug prices. As I have explained to many audiences, comparing the VA approach to Medicare Part D is not even an apples to oranges comparison. It's more like comparing apples and poodles - and makes as much sense.

A groundbreaking study, by Frank R. Lichtenberg, Ph.D. of the Columbia School of Business, should put such comparisons to rest. In Older Drugs, Shorter Lives? An Examination of the Health Effects of the Veterans Health Administration Formulary, Dr. Lichtenberg shows the VH approach is not about prices or genuine negotiations. With the VA's tight budget, it is all about restricting veterans' access to new (and many old) medications to save dollars and hit budget targets.

The VA's highly restrictive national formulary excludes 62% of drugs approved by the FDA during the 1990's and 81% of new medications approved since 2000. Even worse, the drug benefit designed for our nation's veterans does not pay for a staggering 78% of new, high-priority prescription drugs approved by the FDA on an expedited basis since 1997 because of their life-saving impact. By comparison, commercial health plans, Medicare Part D drug plans, and state Medicaid programs cover the vast majority of new drugs and move quick to add coverage for most drugs given fast-track by the FDA.

Dr. Lichtenberg's 2005 study shows that the VA's prescription drug system - seen by many as the "model" for Medicare Part D - reduced the life span and survival rates of vets since its 1997 introduction. Note to Congress: Death is always cheaper than life but rarely preferable.

Recap:

So, let's recap. Even putting aside the dangers of a massive increase in government power, fact it would dramatically reduce consumer and physician decision making, fact it would shift costs to other payors, and fact it would inevitably lead to economically disastrous price controls, the federal government negotiating drug prices will likely save little or nothing - unless Congress wants to severely restrict patient access to new and existing medications, thereby shortening lives, reducing quality of life, and increasing costs well beyond any savings. And that's if it's even feasible for CMS to do it. Trust me, it's not.

Medicare drug plans will dramatically increase coverage of over-the-counter (OTC) drugs in 2007 based on new guidance from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

In creating Medicare Part D, the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) excluded OTCs from coverage. Taxpayer dollars could not be used to pay for OTC products even when clinically appropriate and cost effective. This was in sharp contrast to pharmacy benefit designs common in commercial coverage and Medicaid, where employers, states, health plans, and PBMs try to take advantage of new, inexpensive OTC alternatives to popular prescription drugs.

For 2006, CMS allowed Medicare prescription drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare Advantage drug plans (MA-PDs) to cover OTCs under narrow circumstances. For example, OTC coverage was limited to federally approved step therapy programs, with no prior authorization for the OTC. To pay for OTC products, drug plans must use administrative dollars and not federal benefit dollars.

For 2007, CMS is loosening restrictions on PDP and MA-PD coverage of safe, effective over-the-counter drugs that are less expensive than prescription alternatives in the plan's formulary. Medicare drug plans must still use administrative dollars because of the statutory limit. However, OTC products may be covered outside of a step therapy program. To ensure Part D enrollees have continued access to prescription versions, drug plans that decide to cover OTCs outside a federally-approval step therapy protocol may not use prior authorization or other tools to require OTC use before a formulary legend drug is covered. Plans must also educate enrollees on differences between the prescription and non-prescription available for a given need.

Compared to their prescription alternatives, OTCs often represent savings of 60-70 percent or more. Seniors tend to be heavy users of proton pump inhibitors (PPI), non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), and antihistamines - categories with low-cost OTC alternatives likely appropriate for many patients. Therefore, next year many Medicare drug plans will likely offer free OTCs to drive utilization, reduce costs, ease the doughnut hole, and improve enrollee satisfaction and retention.

In addition to reducing costs for drug plans and many beneficiaries, wider access to OTCs in Part D may also reduce state Medicaid spending. Under MMA, 6 million dual eligibles were moved from Medicaid to Medicare for purposes of most drug coverage. However, Medicaid drug coverage is broader than Medicare Part D in many states. To save dollars, most states cover some OTCs. If a state Medicaid program covers an OTC for one group of Medicaid recipients, federal law requires the state to cover the OTC for all, including dual eligibles. The continued overlap of Medicare and Medicaid drug coverage for duals creates opportunities for confusion, cost shifting, even gaming. But the new OTC coverage options in Part D should allow states to save some Medicaid pharmacy dollars - provided CMS is proactive in working cooperatively with states, drug plans, and pharmacies on the issue.

While drug plans and beneficiaries will win - and states may win - from the new OTC coverage guidance, pharmacies will lose because of lower product and dispensing fee revenue. Some pharmaceutical manufacturers will also lose, notably those prescription drug makers facing competing OTCs in hot categories like proton pump inhibitors.

Being a Medicare prescription drug plan can be a profitable business. For the smart players, it will be highly profitable over time and indispensable to market position. But Medicare Part D can also be financially risky and volatile - particularly given: