The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) - the influential independent Congressional agency charged with advising Congress on a wide range of Medicare policy issues - has released its Medicare payment policy recommendations for 2009. The 355-page report includes a weath of information for those tracking Medicare provider or health plan issues, particularly annual provider payment updates, reforms to Medicare Advantage, and quality incentives.

In summary, here are MedPAC's recommendations to Congress:

Hospital Inpatient and Outpatient Services:

Physician Services:

Outpatient Dialysis Services:

Skilled Nursing Facility Services:

Home Health Services:

Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Services:

Long-Term Care Hospital Services:

Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans:

Part D Enrollment, Benefit Offerings, and Drug Plan Payments:

Medicare Savings Programs and Part D Low-Income Drug Subsidy:

To read the full MedPAC report, click here (large PDF file).

The journal Medical Care has published series of outstanding articles on emerging methods and tools to compare the effectiveness of medical therapies, prescription drugs, and devices. The peer-reviewed articles are an outgrowth from a symposium on comparative effectiveness research sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).

Here are links to the individual articles in PDF format:

The 10-year old, extremely popular, and reasonably successful State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) expires in six weeks. Congress and the White House must agree on a reauthorization bill, and so far the parties are far apart.

Here are some key resources to understand the radically different House and Senate bills. Most notably, the House bill is far more expansive and expensive. While the bill is ostensively to reauthorize and expand SCHIP, the House bill would also make dozens of significant changes to both Medicare and Medicaid. The more moderate Senate bill focuses on renewing SCHIP, providing additional federal dollars to cover more children, and proposing higher tobacco taxes to offset the new federal SCHIP costs.

Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (Senate Bill 1893):

The Senate bill, called the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, would extend coverage to an additional 2.2 million children. This is a net figure. An estimated 4.5 million kids would move to SCHIP coverage, but CBO estimates that 1.7 million of these would move from private insurance to SCHIP because of crowd-out and another 600,000 would move from Medicaid to SCHIP. Because of interactions between Medicaid and SCHIP coverage, the Senate bill would increase add, net of crowd-out, about 1.5 million kids to Medicaid.

To sum up, the Senate approach would provide SCHIP or Medicaid health coverage to a net 4 million uninsured children. But about 2.1 million privately insured children would have to move from their existing private insurance coverage to taxpayer financed care. To read the Congressional Budget Office's cost and enrollment estimates for the Senate bill, click here.

Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act (HR 3162):

Based on CBO projections, the House bill, called the Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act, would increase coverage for a net 5 million children. About 3.1 million uninsured kids would be newly covered by Medicaid and about 1.9 million by SCHIP.

Again, because government financed health coverage "crowds out" private coverage, the House bill would cause about 2.5 million insured children to lose existing private coverage and move to taxpayer-funded coverage. Click here to read CBO's cost and enrollment estimates for the House bill, including the bill's many unrelated changes to Medicare and Medicaid.

Before closing, it's important to note that whatever Congress does with SCHIP reauthorization, the program is highly dependent on subsequent state policies, including appropriation of state budget dollars. And several aspects of the Congressional SCHIP proposals would hurt state finances and restrict flexibility, making children's health coverage at the state level more costly and complex.

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made major, controversial, and technically complex changes to Medicaid prescription drug pricing and pharmacy reimbursement. The policy changes, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, present significant challenges to both drug manufacturers and retail pharmacies.

To implement the DRA changes, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued final rules that, most notably: (a) revise the definition of average manufacturer price (AMP), (b) create a new formula for calculating Federal Upper Limits (FULs) on multisource drugs, (c) require rebates for certain physician-administered drugs, and (d) clarify rebate liability for authorized generic drugs.

Significant Implications:

For pharmacies, the DRA changes represent significant cuts to Medicaid reimbursement - unless states act to mitigate the changes or increase dispensing fees to compensate for lower product reimbursement. While CMS tried to mitigate the impact on pharmacies, studies by GAO, OIG, and pharmacy trade groups suggest that pharmacies could easily lose money with many drugs dispensed under Medicaid, with the biggest loss in generic drugs.

The changes also hold major implications for pharmaceutical companies. The new policies create new financial, operational, and compliance challenges. They will require most drug makers to rethink pricing strategies and access the impact across all their classes of trade. Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), a calculation that has been a closely held secret under the law since 1991, will become transparent through monthly public reporting of AMP-based prices of every drug on sale in the U.S. You may expect this to have some interesting effects on marketplace behavior and payor negotiations. And, of course, the changes will increase rebate payments to states.

States will benefit from the resulting cost savings. However, state Medicaid directors face strong pressure from community and chain pharmacies to compensate for lost revenue. States also have concerns about the reliability of CMS and pharma industry data, especially in the first couple years given the big change in methodology, scope, and frequency of data reporting. States must also make a variety of systems changes under short notice.

Across the health care system, the DRA changes are further evidence of the increasing power of government policy on the pharmaceutical supply chain. Now that taxpayer-funded health programs pay for the majority of drugs, changes in Medicaid or Medicare drug policy are no longer limited to affected program. Federal changes ripple throughout the industry, forcing changes in commercial practices and business strategy.

Finally, the new rules put a few more nails in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or published prices.

Average Manufacturer Price:

In concept, Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) is the average unit price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the U.S. by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade. (Try to repeat that ten times fast.) However, how this plays out has been highly controversial, leading to inconsistencies across manufacturers, numerous highly critical studies by the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO), allegations of gaming, and countless law suits against drug makers by U.S. attorneys and state attorneys general.

Following the statutory changes made by the DRA, CMS' final rule makes several fundamental changes to AMP. Most notably, the final rule:

Prior to the DRA, sales by a manufacturer of covered outpatient drugs below 10% of AMP were defined as "nominal sales" and generally excluded from Medicaid best price. While the final rule continues to define nominal sales as those sales at less than 10% of AMP, the best price exemption will now be limited to sales to: 340B covered entities, intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF-MRs), and state-owned or operated nursing facilities.

Federal Upper Limits:

For twenty years, the federal rules have limited the amount state Medicaid programs may reimburse pharmacies for generic drugs. Using a Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for each affected drug product, the idea is to help ensure the government is a prudent buyer and pays close to market levels. Before the DRA, the FUL was set at 150% of the published price for the least costly therapeutic equivalent using all available national price compendia.

However, that never worked well. Over time, the old FUL system became very costly to states and problematic for nearly everyone involved.

As a result, the DRA changed the methodology used to establish a FUL on multiple source drugs:

Requirements for Drug Manufacturers:

To accomplish all these changes in AMP and FUL, the law creates new requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers. As I discussed in an earlier post, these new requirements, when coupled with the new approach to AMP, create significant financial, operational, and compliance challenges to pharma companies.

Most notably, pharma companies must:

Rebates on Physician-Administered Drugs:

Before DRA, most States did not collect rebates on physician-administered drugs. Physician drug claims typically did not contain the National Drug Codes (NDCs) necessary for state to invoice drug manufacturers for rebates. Per the DRA, the CMS rule requires states to collect NDC numbers from providers to enable rebate collection on biologics and other physician-administered drugs in Medicaid.

This year, state Medicaid agencies must require providers to submit claims for single source, physician-administered drugs using HCPCS codes or NDC numbers that allow states to bill for rebates. Starting next year, states must require providers to submit claims for single source physician-administered drugs and 20 Secretary-specified, multiple source physician-administered drugs using NDC numbers. States that require additional time to comply may ask for a hardship waiver.

The Carlyle Group, a large private equity firm, announced today that it is buying Manor Care, a large operator of nursing homes and long-term care services, for $6 billion. This got the good folks at Marketplace Radio to ask why private equity firms seem to be so interested in buying up health care companies. And the resulting radio story broadcast today brought together an unusual cast of characters, including myself and Michael Moore. Yes, that Michael Moore.

To listen to the radio interview, click here. To read the transcript online, click here.

Kerry Weems, Secretary Mike Leavitt's deputy chief of staff and President Bush's nominee to head the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), faces tough Senate confirmation hearings in July. A savvy, career HHS insider with a wealth of experience in the fiscal and organizational mechanics of federal health programs, Mr. Weems is a good choice for an administrator to steer CMS in the last 18 months of the Bush Administration. But he nonetheless faces several serious challenges during the confirmation process. A few examples:

1. Efforts to Hold Confirmation Hostage to Policy Commitments:

Senators, trade groups, and advocates of all flavors have long policy wish lists. As FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D. can attest, the confirmation process - in committee and on the Senate floor - is a unique opportunity for Democrats and even some Republicans to hold up confirmation until the nominee or Department concedes to certain policy demands. And the wish lists for the FDA are nothing compared to what many want from CMS.

2. A Maze of Medicare and Medicaid Controversies:

For better or worse, a wide range of delicate issues at CMS were left unexamined during Republican control of Congress. The Democrats now in charge of the Hill are eager to make political hay with health issues, reshape policy, and give their core constituencies a crack, albeit by proxy, at challenging CMS actions in a public forum.

Regardless of the Administration or the party running the Executive Branch, Medicare and Medicaid are full of dirty little secrets, some real and some imagined, intertwined within a massive level of complexity prone to misconception and manipulation by political foes and those of varying motivations eager for a larger slice of an $800 billion+ pie. Many critics of CMS see the Weems nomination hearings and floor debate as a unique opportunity.

3. Nomination of a Non-Wonk:

While Kerry Weems has a lot going for him and CMS would likely benefit from leadership by a career insider, he is not a health policy wonk. That is, he is not a academic, researcher, health policy maker, or lobbyist (not that most lobbyists are mavens but they like playing them on TV). He's a budget and finance guy and a career one at that. Not a bad thing at all, but a potential problem in a town that grossly overvalues what MD's and PhD's typically know about health policy or finance and sees "budget guys" in health programs as somehow being on a first name basis with the devil.

Some advocacy groups, who naturally have the ear of Dems in the Senate, are concerned that Mr. Weems lacks the requisite substantive expertise in Medicare or Medicaid policy (well, make that Medicare, since unfortunately few inside the Beltway understand or track Medicaid). When a Republican is in charge of the White House, Dems and advocates are much more comfortable with an academic running CMS. And when a Democrat is in charge, they virtually insist on it. In its 30-year history, CMS (formerly named HCFA) has had nearly as many administrators and acting administrators. Add to this extremely high turnover the fact that CMS is rather unique in having a tiny number of political appointees.

There are notable exceptions. Gail Wilensky, Ph.D., one of the nation's most talented health policy experts, turned out to be an excellent administrator in the early 1990's. And there have been times where the agency was led by a budget guy, most notably Leonard Schaeffer, who ran HCFA is its early days. He came to HCFA from managing health budgets for the State of Illinois and later was the founding chairman and CEO of WellPoint.

Kerry Weems will have his hands full next month. But he's a smart fellow, with a keen sense for detail, and HHS and CMS staffs are briefing him around the clock in preparation. He'll do well before the Senate if given a fair shake.

When it comes to innovation in health coverage, finance, and purchasing, states are the most likely innovators. The role states can play as laboratories of reform is a key advantage of our Federalist system of government. Right now, as many states find themselves in a strong fiscal condition, states are taking the lead in expanding health coverage, reforming market dynamics, and transforming Medicaid.

As with any kind innovation, states play different roles and vary in their ability and interest in adopting a particular innovation in coverage, financing, or care delivery. Some states will play the role of genuine innovators, while others will follow the leaders. Still others will take their time and a few will lag well behind the field.

You can see this play out in Medicaid managed care, where a few states like Wisconsin, Arizona, and Minnesota are serial innovators. Several other states follow their lead fairly quickly. And a few states, notably states like Mississippi, Illinois, and Alabama, tend to lag well behind the country.

Studies on the diffusion of innovation may be helpful to businesses, wonks, advocates, and others as they try to understand, navigate, influence, and ultimately take advantage of state health reforms.

Experts in the diffusion of innovation say that adopters of any particular new idea or approach can be reliably categorized into five groups:

Innovators: About 2.5% of players (individuals, businesses, or, in our context here, states) are the true innovators. They tend to be adventurous, open to new ideas, decisive, willing to take risks, highly educated, well versed in best practices, and connected to best sources of information.

Early Adopters: Studies say that early adopters are about 13.5% of a market. They are typically popular among their peers, smart, well educated. They are less creative, less venturesome than the innovators but are fairly decisive and like to ride the leading edge, gaining what they can from advances.

Early Majority: About 34% are deliberate in assessing a new idea. They take their time, prefer others to take the lead in advancing business or policy, and are more informally connected to thought leaders and mavens.

Late Majority: Late Majority players, also about 34% of population, are skeptics and traditionalists. With fewer resources, less internal expertise, and more moderate education, they are risk adverse, rather indecisive, and extremely cautious in adopting, implementing, and evaluating new ideas.

Laggards: About 16% are true laggards, often in every sense of the word. They are highly risk adverse, isolated from best practices and their peers, and conservative by instinct. They are often not so much indecisive as they are indifferent or nonplused by decision making.

Applying this to the world of states and health reform, we are likely to see about 3 states playing role as genuine innovators and another 7 states as quick adopters. Another 34 states will take more time, either in adopting an innovation as policy or in implementing it locally. Finally, about 8 states will likely do little or nothing. Of course, a state that is an innovator in one policy domain - like managed care - may be a follower in some other area like coverage expansion. And we should not underestimate the impact of leadership - a new governor or new Medicaid director - on moving a state from late player to innovator.

If you are a business interested in new opportunities created by state health reforms or a trade group or advocate interested in influencing state health policies, you need to know which states are the innovators or early adopters and which are the late players or laggards. Even if you are not interested in an innovator state's local market, you need to understand that state's role in influencing what other states will do. Working closely with the innovators and early adopters can generate invaluable market intelligence and lead to unique, powerful position as reforms move across the country.

To learn more, please visit my list of recommended reading on innovation.

Normally, $15 million a year doesn't buy you much in the federal government. A notable exception is the Effective Health Care Program at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Drug manufacturers, device makers, health plans, state Medicaid agencies, Wall Street analysts, physicians, and patient groups should all follow it closely.

The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) authorized AHRQ to conduct and support research on outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals, devices, and health care services. With a modest budget, a tiny but dedicated staff, and partnerships with top research institutions, AHRQ's Effective Health Care Program involves three approaches to research the comparative effectiveness of different medical treatments, drug therapies, and clinical practices:

1. Review and Synthesize Knowledge: AHRQ's network of 12 Evidence-based Practice Centers systematically review published and unpublished scientific evidence on what is known. Given the huge volume of studies and journal articles produced every year, it is next to impossible for providers, payors, and other key decision makers to keep up and even harder for them to thoughtfully weigh the evidence. AHRQ and its research partners synthesize the science and build a meaningful evidence base.

2. Promote and Generate New Knowledge: The DEcIDE Research Network studies new scientific evidence and analytic tools in an accelerated and practical format. DEcIDE stands for "Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness." Comprised of 13 university research centers and think tanks, the DEcIDE network conducts accelerated practical studies about the comparative clinical effectiveness, safety, and appropriateness of specific health care services, drugs, and devices. In other words, what works best for patients.

3. Compile Findings and Translate and Disseminate Knowledge to Decision Makers: AHRQ's John M. Eisenberg Clinical Decisions and Communications Science Center takes the research results and transform them into into a variety of useful, actionable formats for stakeholders (e.g., providers, payors, purchasers, patients, manufacturers). Specifically, these include (a) consumer guides (short summaries of health care research that can help with decisions about treatments), (b) clinician guides (brief evidence summaries to assist clinical decision making), (c) policymaker guides (short reports of research evidence for use in health care policy making), and (d) white papers on state-of-the-art concepts in health communication.

The past couple years, the initiative has focused on ten priority health care conditions, selected because of their high impact on Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other federal health programs:

Later this year, AHRQ will entertain nominations for other priority conditions.

Here's a sampling of the excellent work already generated. For a directory of these reports, with free access in PDF format, click here:

The Effective Health Care Program has 40 other reports in the works, covering a wide range of topics. These include more comparative effectiveness reviews of specific drugs as well as tools to measure quality, reduce errors, and monitor therapies. To get notified when new research becomes available, sign up for AHRQ's email list.

The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 (reintroduced as Senate Bill 484), sponsored by Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) and co-sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), is worth watching as the new Congress contemplates pharmaceutical industry legislation.

As proposed, The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 has five components:

1. Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require an application for approval for a new drug or biological product to include a proposed Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). Designed to be an integrated, flexible mechanism to acquire and adapt to new safety information about a drug, REMS would require (a) labeling for the drug for use by health care providers; (b) submission of reports for the drug; and (c) a statement as to whether the analysis and surveillance are sufficient to assess the serious risks of the drug. REMS is modeled after the risk management approach taken by the European Union.

2. Establishes a Drug Safety Oversight Board.

3. Requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the Reagan-Udall Institute for Applied Biomedical Research as a nonprofit corporation to advance the Critical Path Initiative to modernize medical product development, accelerate innovation, and enhance product safety. Requires the Institute to have a Board of Directors. Allows the Board to coordinate and collaborate with other entities to conduct research, education, and outreach and to modernize the sciences of developing, manufacturing, and evaluating the safety and effectiveness of diagnostics, devices, biologics, and drugs.

4. Amends the Public Health Service Act to require the Secretary, acting through the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to establish and administer a clinical trial registry database and a clinical trial results database. Requires a responsible party for a clinical trial to submit clinical trial information to the NIH Director for inclusion in the databases.

5. Requires each individual under consideration for a term on an FDA advisory committee providing advice or recommendations to the Secretary regarding FDA activities to disclose industry financial interests.

To learn more, check out the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions' hearing on the bill.

My sources in the Bush Administration tell me that the President will nominate Kerry Weems as the next administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Mr. Weems, a savvy finance expert with a long career at HHS, is well-liked by HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt, former Secretary Tommy Thompson, and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). He served as HHS' budget director and is now deputy chief of staff.

Nomination of Mr. Weems will be a departure from tradition. Historically, CMS administrators have been either academics or lobbyists. The academics often lack leadership and executive skills and the lobbyists often come across as too Machiavellian. Since the agency's creation in 1978, CMS (formerly called HCFA) has had about 30 administrators or acting administrators - about one per year. As a respected career insider, Mr. Weems is well positioned to deal with CMS' powerful, technocratic, hardworking but often demoralized bureaucracy.

Leslie Norwalk, CMS acting administrator, is expected to resign sometime in April. Ms. Norwalk, a health industry lawyer, was counselor to the CMS administrator (Tom Scully) from 2001-2004 and became deputy administrator in 2004.

Herb Kuhn will likely take over as acting administrator while Kerry Weems goes through the grueling Senate confirmation process. Mr. Kuhn, a highly respected hospital industry guru, has been director of CMS' Center for Medicare Management (CMM), which oversees Medicare Part A and Part B policy and Medicare's vast fee-for-service operations. Mr. Kuhn, has been serving as acting deputy administrator. He's a talented, well-liked fellow, and an excellent prospect for deputy administrator.

As CMS goes through the musical chairs, speculation is growing that HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt plans to leave and rejoin the private sector this spring.

Under a new Executive Order, President Bush has significantly expanded the authority of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over policymaking by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Specifically, OMB now has the authority to review and approve a vast array of written guidance issued day-to-day by CMS and FDA. The expansion of OMB's oversight authority has far-reaching implications for Medicare and Medicaid policy and the regulation of the drug and device industries.

In recent years, an increasing amount of agency policymaking has come in the form of "sub-regulatory guidance." That is, written guidance that does not go through the formal rulemaking process. In the case of CMS, this written guidance shows up, for example, as memorandums to health plans, letters to state officials, and manuals or other instructions. In its role administering the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the FDA has its own system of guidance documents.

While the FDA approach to sub-regulatory guidance has its own critics and limitations, the FDA approach is better organized and managed than CMS' approach. FDA has been at it longer than CMS but also has (relatively speaking) a narrower, more explicit scope of work. The FDCA and all its amendments is no walk in the park, but Titles 18, 19, and 21 of the Social Security Act are exercises in pure legislative surrealism.

President Bush's new Executive Order means that much of this written guidance is now subject to prior review and approval by OMB. While OMB has always been a key player, particularly in Medicare and Medicaid policy, the E.O. greatly increases OMB's influence and may result in a substantial power shift in many day-to-day issues affecting providers, health plans, drug manufacturers, states, and other stakeholders. (In the interest of full disclosure, my career includes service on OMB's Medicare and Medicaid team.)

For those interested in more background, below is a quick overview of the rulemaking process and the increasing role of written guidance in lieu of rules.

Background on OMB Regulatory Review:

Virtually all CMS and FDA proposed and final rules are subject to prior review and approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the powerful policy management arm of the White House. (It's important to note that OMB also reviews Medicare and Medicaid waivers, agency budget requests and legislative proposals, and written testimony to Congress.) OMB's regulatory oversight was created by Presidential Executive Order in the Reagan Administration and modified but retained by the Clinton Administration.

The basic idea is to help ensure that agency rulemaking activities follow the sitting President's policy objectives to the extent possible under the laws passed by Congress. OMB oversight also allows for a more thoughtful and disciplined approach to regulations, to keep track of the impact of agency rules on individuals, businesses, and states and guard against such things as unnecessary or excessive regulations and conflicting rules across different federal agencies.

In principle, the rulemaking process is designed to (1) inform the public of planned rules in detail; (2) give the public, including stakeholders and experts, an opportunity to comment, provide new information, and suggest alternatives; (3) ensure the rulemaking agency considers and responds to public comments before issuing final rules; (4) ensure that all federal rules can be found in a central publication (published in the Federal Register and formally codified in the Code of Federal Regulations); and (5) provide a comprehensive public record for use by the courts, Congress, and the news media in overseeing an agency's use of power and interpretation of statutes.

Written Guidance Instead of Formal Rules:

In other words, the formal rulemaking process provides for far more thoughtful, documented, and transparent policymaking than the so-called sub-regulatory guidance. However, developing proposed and final rules is a laborious process taking months and sometimes even years. And CMS faces the imperatives of implementing massive pieces of legislation, such as the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) and the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). Even if CMS always had the necessary staff, expertise, systems, and budget to implement the avalanche of Medicare and Medicaid legislation on time (it never does, unfortunately), there are just not enough hours in the day to promulgate all the necessary rules to meet statutory deadlines.

Therefore, much of CMS policymaking is done through written guidance, letters, memos, and memos - and not regulations. While it's easy to understand the practical pressures, many legal observers seriously question CMS's compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The APA, originally enacted in 1946, governs when and how agencies must go through the formal rulemaking process.

Privately, several players have told me how CMS's informal approach to many Medicare and Medicaid policies would likely not stand up in federal court. However, trade groups, states, and other stakeholders don't want to anger the increasingly powerful agency - and, in many cases, written guidance today is better than waiting months or even years for a rule.

Like its sister agency CMS, the FDA is increasingly using sub-regulatory guidance in lieu of formal rules. Given the demands facing the FDA, including a variety of reforms and pending legislative changes, this is expected to increase. To get a flavor, check out the list of guidance documents from the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDRR). You'll see it includes various backgrounders mixed with policy statements and instructions.

The $7 billion State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) is up for reauthorization in Congress this year. SCHIP, which began in October 1997, now covers over four million Americans, primarily children in families with incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid but too low to afford commercial health insurance coverage.

Popular with both Democrats and Republicans, SCHIP is certain to be reauthorized by Congress. However, members of Congress differ on whether and to what extent SCHIP should be expanded, how much to increase federal funding, whether SCHIP should be reserved for truly low income children or open to more moderate income families, and whether SCHIP should be used as a vehicle to expand coverage to uninsured workers. In addition, there remain serious questions about how much taxpayer-funded SCHIP has crowded out employer-sponsored coverage.

The policy issues and design options are many. Ultimately, the battle over SCHIP is a microcosm of the larger national debate on what government can or should do about the uninsured, the role of individual and employer responsibility, what is "affordable", what is an adequate package of covered benefits, and much more.

Overview of SCHIP:

Each state, within broad federal guidelines, determines the design of its own program, including eligibility, benefit design, cost sharing, and operating procedures. States may operate SCHIP separately or in conjunction with Medicaid. SCHIP benefits are delivered primarily through health plans under contract with states.

On a federal level, SCHIP is governed by Title XXI of the Social Security Act. However, several states have requested and received Section 1115 waivers to redesign the SCHIP eligibility, cost sharing, and/or benefits.

Unlike Medicaid, which is largely an open-ended entitlement, states may cap SCHIP enrollment and federal funds for SCHIP are capped. This year, unless Congress increases aggregate federal funds for SCHIP, about 16 states may need to either cap enrollment or appropriate additional state funds to maintain the program.

Budget Challenge of Funding Children's Health Coverage:

The best guess is Congress will need to increase the federal cap on SCHIP funding by $12 billion to $15 billion over the next five years to maintain coverage for the four million now enrolled. (During the year, about six million receive coverage at some point and about four million are covered at any given point in time.) Absent either a big increase in the federal cap or a big jump in state-only appropriations to SCHIP, about one million kids will lose coverage.

Resources to Understand SCHIP:

Here are several excellent resources to better understand the State Children's Health Insurance Program:

In health care, states serve as the nation's laboratories of reform - able to test innovations in financing, coverage, regulation, and care delivery. In 2007, states are leading the way on health insurance coverage expansion, leveraging a mix of policies including universal coverage, individual mandates, tax credits and Section 125 plans, and insurance "exchanges" or "connectors" to facilitate buying of affordable health plans.

Because so much is going on and since I do a fair amount of workin this area, several readers of the Piper Report asked me to post some resources on what's going on in the states. So here you go.

State Health Reform Commissions:

Several states have created task forces or study committees to examine options for coverage expansion and make recommendations. Most are appointed by the governor or governor and legislative leaders. A few are special committees of the legislature. Here are states with health reform commissions:

Governors' Health Care Reform Initiatives:

Several governors have announced detailed health reform proposals. Most focus largely or entirely on coverage expansion but several also thankfully include initiatives to improve quality of care, combat medical errors, and/or increase transparency of provider prices and performance.

More Resources on State-Based Health Reform:

Massachusetts, of course, started the ball rolling with its groundbreaking, bipartisan reform initiative in 2006. To learn more, here's an excellent article from BNA's Health Policy Report on the impact of Massachusetts health reform on coverage expansion efforts in others states (PDF).

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) maintains a helpful list of legislative bills on universal coverage proposed in states.

For the best books on health reform, Medicaid, and other hot topics in health care, please visit my book recommendations.

For latest state-specific data on health care coverage and spending, check out the free, easy-to-use tools on StateHealthFacts.org.

Questions on State Health Reform:

Feel free to contact me if you have questions on what's going on in the states.

The federal False Claims Act has been an effective tool in combating fraud and abuse in government programs, particularly Medicare. Several states have their own state versions of false claims legislation. The federal Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), enacted last February, gives states a powerful new financial incentive to enact state false claims acts modeled after the federal version and directed at fighting Medicaid fraud and abuse.

Specifically, states with state false claims acts that meet certain federal standards are able to keep more of whatever is recovered from fraudulent Medicaid providers or suppliers. The incentive amounts to ten percentage points of any recovery. For example, if a state has a 50% federal Medicaid match, it would normally have to return to the feds 50% of anything recovered. However, if the state has a federally compliant false claims act, the state gets to keep 60% or a 10 percentage point jump in its share. For most states, this could easily result in millions of dollars kept in the state.

OIG Review of State False Claims Acts:

Under the DRA, the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for looking at state false claims laws (whether new, existing, or amended) to see if they meet the federal standard and therefore if the state gets the incentive. To read the OIG's review guidelines, click here.

So far, at the request of state officials, the OIG has looked at existing statutes in ten states: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas. According to the OIG, the state false claims statutes in Illinois, Massachusetts, and Tennessee meet the DRA requirements and therefore these states' Medicaid programs may keep more of any Medicaid recoveries. The other states will need to amend their statutes if they wish to qualify for financial incentive.

Background on Federal False Claims Act:

Since the nation's founding, federal law has permitted private citizens to sue on behalf of the government to combat fraud in public programs. If the fraud or false claim is proven in court, the citizen bringing the suit gets to keep a portion of the funds recovered as an incentive.

Today, fraud fighters and whistleblowers use the federal False Claims Act, which was enacted in 1863 to stop fraud by military suppliers to the Union Army. Revised several times by Congress, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) has been increasingly used to bring lawsuits against health care providers and suppliers.

Of course, federal prosecutors may also bring criminal charges but in criminal cases they must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil cases are much easier to win in the complex world of health care claims since the standard is a preponderance of the evidence.

How the False Claims Act Works:

Under the False Claims Act, a person with knowledge of fraud against the U.S. government may file a civil suit on behalf of the government against the person or business that allegedly committed the fraud. These are referred to qui tam cases. "Qui tam" (pronounced "key tam" or "kwee tam" and Latin for "who as well") is used in short for longer Latin phrase meaning "he who (sues) for the king as well as for himself." (Okay, for Latin buffs, it's qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipse. Now you know why everybody just says Qui Tam.)

Qui tam lawsuits are first filed with the federal district court in secret, to give the U.S. Justice Department time to decide whether to intervene and take over prosecuting the case itself. DOJ takes on about a quarter of these cases. If DOJ decides not to take the case, the qui tam plaintiff or "relator" - who is often an internal whistleblower since they need to be the source of information in the case - may pursue the case on behalf of the federal government but at his or her own expense. However, unlike other civil actions where a person can represent themselves (unwise but possible), the relator must hire an attorney to represent them.

The False Claims Act provides for treble damages. Therefore, if fraud is proven through the civil case, the defendant(s) are liable for three times the original cost of the fraud to the taxpayers - plus civil fines of $5,000 to $10,000 for each instance of fraud or false claim.

The amount received by a successful qui tam plaintiff depends on whether the DOJ took the case. If the Justice Department takes the case, the qui tam plaintiff gets between 15% and 25% of the recovery. If the Justice Department declines to take the case and the relator pursues the civil suit on their own, the qui tam plaintiff receives 25% to 30% of the recovery.

Given the size of some of these incentives, the Justice Department often balks and tries to get them reduced, arguing that the plaintiff lacked the direct knowledge required to qualify. Therefore, the payouts to successful whistleblowers often lead to legal battles long after the fraud is proven and defendants pay up.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in just such a case where the federal government was challenging the right of a successful qui tam plaintiff to collect a portion of recoveries. The ruling, expected by this summer, could have a major impact on future qui tam suits.

Please check out my previous posts on Medicaid program integrity issues.

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made a series of significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing, Medicaid best price rebates, and Medicaid payments to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The new policies, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, create major challenges to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies.

DRA Drug Pricing Changes in a Nutshell:

While the DRA has many moving parts, in general the new policies will:

1. Drive more Medicaid drug spending toward generics and reduce the market advantages of authorized generics.

2. Make Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) - a key measure of drug prices in the marketplace and the metric used in determining Medicaid rebates - transparent to the public. Previously, AMP was confidential and known only to government officials.

3. Lower AMP on many prescription drugs, putting drug makers under increased cost pressures and increasing Medicaid rebates to states.

4. Increase the compliance risks of drug manufacturers.

5. Reduce Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies.

6. Put another nail in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) by moving Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement systems from AWP to AMP.

Federal Proposed Rules:

Today, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released proposed rules on implementing the DRA drug pricing policies. Final rules are expected in June 2007.

However, because key provisions are effective on January 1, 2007, pharma companies must come into compliance based on incomplete guidance and be prepared to make major changes again this summer.

DRA Changes to Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price:

The law requires significant changes to how drug manufacturers calculate Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price (BP), reducing the market power of some key price concessions used by manufacturers:

Drug manufacturers must report AMP on a monthly basis starting January 2007. More importantly, average manufacturer prices on all drugs will publicly posted on CMS' website starting Spring 2007 after CMS resolves some data and systems issues. Previously, reporting was quarterly and confidential by law.

DRA also mandates significant changes to the federal upper payment limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs. The feds are widening the definition of what is a multiple source drug and setting FUL at 250% of AMP. Previously, FUL was set at 150% of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). This will further increase pricing pressure on brand drugs when generics are available.

Operational Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Industry:

The drug industry faces many practical, operational challenges in meeting the new requirements for 2007:

1. Incomplete federal guidance. Until the final rules arrive, the drug industry must implement the DRA changes with limited federal guidance. Key factors still unclear include class of trade designations, treatment of administrative and service fees, adjusting for lagged price concessions and returned goods, correcting and restating AMP, and a variety of baseline AMP issues.

2. Moving from quarterly to more complex monthly reporting, plus adjusting for each month's transactions.

3. Adapting data, systems, staff, and reporting to accommodate different pricing methodologies required by CMS. For example, calculating and reporting AMP under Medicaid vs. calculating and reporting Average Sales Price (ASP) under Medicare Part B.

Financial Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Companies:

The new DRA policies also pose significant financial challenges for pharma companies. For example:

Compliance Challenges of DRA for Drug Manufacturers:

The DRA changes present new or expanded compliance challenges for drug manufacturers. Given the frequency, changes, and overall complexity, there are many ways to inadvertently screw up federal reporting. Ensuring compliance will require heavy reliance on other parts of company and on external partners. Transparency of pricing will likely lead to new regulations, audits, and Congressional hearings. Finally, while over time DRA reporting may make it easier to defend against suits, companies should expect dramatic increase in whistleblower suits under federal and state False Claims Acts.

Learn More:

For the DRA statutory changes affecting drug pricing, click here (PDF).

For the proposed rule, click here (PDF). For CMS' fact sheet on the proposed rule, click here (PDF).

Read the OIG's recommendations to the HHS Secretary on DRA implementation issues. The OIG report includes useful background information.

For more information or a briefing, feel free to contact me.

The 109th Congress ended in the early morning hours on Saturday, with both houses passing by comfortable margins the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. With Democrats taking control of both the House and Senate when the 110th Congress begins the first week of January, GOP leaders were anxious to resolve some key policy items before Democrats take the helm.

The final legislation, which President Bush is expected to sign, includes an array of changes in tax laws, Medicare, and health savings accounts (HSAs), along with technical corrections to drafting errors in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) and the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA). Today, I'll walk you through the Medicaid-related changes of importance to states and Medicaid health plans and providers.

Medicaid Legislative Changes:

As I reported earlier, the White House had been signaling its intention to issue a rule to cut Medicaid provider tax rates from a maximum of 6 percent - the ceiling that's been in place since 1993 - to 3 percent. The effect would have been to reduce federal funds to state Medicaid programs by $6 billion or more. Members of both parties were anxious to enact legislation to stop the Bush Administration's planned rule to restrict state use of provider taxes. States, provider groups, and beneficiary advocates were lobbying hard to stop the controversial rule change.

In Section 403 of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act, Congress codifies the maximum provider tax rate at 6 percent. From January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2011, the rate will be temporarily reduced to 5.5 percent. On October 1, 2011, the cap on tax rates goes back to 6 percent.

Implications for States and Providers:

Ah, the joys of Medicaid complexity. In a nutshell, here's what this means:

1. The planned CMS rule to drop the maximum provider tax rates to 3% is now moot. If the President signs the bill, the section will become law and negate the planned rule change.

2. The legislated change from 6 percent - which is what's now set in rule - to 5.5 percent is expected to cause few, if any, problems for most states that now use provider taxes to leverage federal match to help finance Medicaid. States not in compliance with the new 5.5 percent cap have a year to either modify their assessment program or make likely modest changes to how the resulting funds are distributed within Medicaid.

3. The fiscal effect on states is relatively small, especially when compared to the $6 billion hit states were looking if the rule was issued. Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the half percent change will only save the feds $200 million over the next five years. As federal budget estimating goes, that's barely above a rounding error.

The federal requirements governing Medicaid provider taxes are complex, with many moving parts. In general, federal law requires that health care-related assessments are uniform, broad-based, and do not hold providers harmless. The percentage cap is part of how the feds determine whether a state provider tax is compliant with the hold harmless requirement. States ne