Health Insurance Exchanges - either state-based exchanges favored by moderate Democrats and Republicans (reflected in Senate bill) or a national, federally-run exchange favored by liberal Democrats (version in the House bill) - are an essential component of national health reform.

Bottom line, health insurance exchanges would provide a far more efficient, competitive, and seamless marketplace for consumers and small business to buy health insurance coverage, while also facilitating subsidies for low-income families, easy comparison of benefit packages, and transparency of premiums.

Deborah Maggart, a health care communications specialist at TogoRun, has written an interesting article on two competing visions of health insurance exchanges (HIEs) and implications for communications.

The article includes links to additional resources on HIEs.

To aid the incoming 111th Congress and Obama Administration, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a 235-page report outlining 115 budget options for health care reform. The report catalogs most of the hottest legislative ideas on Capitol Hill, with useful background information and scores of costs and savings. Here's the list of reform ideas in the report:

The Private Health Insurance Market:

The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance:

Changing the Availability of Health Insurance Through Existing Federal Programs:

The Quality and Efficiency of Health Care:

Geographic Variation in Spending for Medicare:

Paying for Medicare Services:

Financing and Paying for Services in Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Program:

Premiums and Cost Sharing in Federal Health Programs:

Long-Term Care:

Health Behavior and Health Promotion:

Serious and costly performance problems riddle U.S. health care. Because of overuse, under use, and misuse of health care, researchers at the Juran Institute and elsewhere estimate that about 30 percent of health care costs are generated by poor quality. Therefore, poor quality medical care will cost about $720 billion in 2008 (30% of $2.4 trillion).

Poor quality also reduces productivity. For every dollar of health care spending caused by poor quality, poor care costs an estimated 50 cents in lost productivity. When applied to the $822 billion in care provided through employer-sponsored insurance, this translates to an additional $123 billion in costs.

A recent study by the Health Research Institute at PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that wasteful health care spending costs $1.2 trillion annually. Analyzing findings from a wealth of published studies, the PwC researchers looked at the cost of waste from clinically inappropriate care and overt errors, individual behaviors leading to costly health problems, and antiquated operational processes that add costs without providing any value.

Making matters worse, research on the care patients receive from physicians, hospitals, and other providers paints a frustrating, even scary picture. For example, studies conducted by the respected RAND Corporation show that Americans receive clinically inadequate or inappropriate care at shockingly high rates.

Specifically, RAND's research shows that acute care for insured adults is appropriate only 53.5 percent of the time on average. In other words, about 46 percent of acute care is clinically incorrect. Similarly, about 43.9 percent of chronic care and 45.1 percent of preventive care is inappropriate according to accepted medical standards. Children receive 68 percent of recommended care for acute medical problems, 53 percent of recommended care for chronic medical conditions, and 41 percent of recommended preventive care.

The bottom line is health care - whether for adults or children - is inappropriate or unnecessary about half the time. Basically, it's a coin flip.

Root Causes of Poor Quality, High Costs:

Ultimately, three immutable laws of economics explain the underlying causes of this poor performance:

1. Price is what you pay but value is what you get:

Taking a page from Warren Buffet's playbook, buyers of health benefits must focus on value, not price. Price is an important part of the equation but meaningless if you don't know the value of what you are receiving for that price. Unfortunately, in health care we obsess on unit prices. In no other marketplace or domain of life do Americans - corporations, consumers, federal and state policymakers, news media - pay so much attention to price and so little to value.

2. You get what you pay for:

Today, we pay for quantity, not quality. Poor performers are sustained and rewarded. The best performers are financially penalized and professionally demoralized. The consequences are all too obvious.

3. You can't fix what you can't see:

In sharp contrast to virtually every other industry, health care is highly opaque. American health care is full of decision makers - consumers, physicians, and other providers, health plans, public officials - who lack the information needed to make decisions.

Five Steps to Higher Performance:

The problems are daunting but solvable. To improve the quality and cost effectiveness of health care delivery, purchasers and payors must tightly focus on strategies to expect, measure, disclose, reward, and support results:

1. Expect Results:

2. Measure Results:

3. Disclose Results:

4. Reward Results:

5. Support Results:

Support the infrastructure and processes essential to results-driven health care. These include:

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made a series of significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing, Medicaid best price rebates, and Medicaid payments to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The new policies, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, create major challenges to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies.

DRA Drug Pricing Changes in a Nutshell:

While the DRA has many moving parts, in general the new policies will:

1. Drive more Medicaid drug spending toward generics and reduce the market advantages of authorized generics.

2. Make Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) - a key measure of drug prices in the marketplace and the metric used in determining Medicaid rebates - transparent to the public. Previously, AMP was confidential and known only to government officials.

3. Lower AMP on many prescription drugs, putting drug makers under increased cost pressures and increasing Medicaid rebates to states.

4. Increase the compliance risks of drug manufacturers.

5. Reduce Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies.

6. Put another nail in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) by moving Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement systems from AWP to AMP.

Federal Proposed Rules:

Today, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released proposed rules on implementing the DRA drug pricing policies. Final rules are expected in June 2007.

However, because key provisions are effective on January 1, 2007, pharma companies must come into compliance based on incomplete guidance and be prepared to make major changes again this summer.

DRA Changes to Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price:

The law requires significant changes to how drug manufacturers calculate Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price (BP), reducing the market power of some key price concessions used by manufacturers:

Drug manufacturers must report AMP on a monthly basis starting January 2007. More importantly, average manufacturer prices on all drugs will publicly posted on CMS' website starting Spring 2007 after CMS resolves some data and systems issues. Previously, reporting was quarterly and confidential by law.

DRA also mandates significant changes to the federal upper payment limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs. The feds are widening the definition of what is a multiple source drug and setting FUL at 250% of AMP. Previously, FUL was set at 150% of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). This will further increase pricing pressure on brand drugs when generics are available.

Operational Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Industry:

The drug industry faces many practical, operational challenges in meeting the new requirements for 2007:

1. Incomplete federal guidance. Until the final rules arrive, the drug industry must implement the DRA changes with limited federal guidance. Key factors still unclear include class of trade designations, treatment of administrative and service fees, adjusting for lagged price concessions and returned goods, correcting and restating AMP, and a variety of baseline AMP issues.

2. Moving from quarterly to more complex monthly reporting, plus adjusting for each month's transactions.

3. Adapting data, systems, staff, and reporting to accommodate different pricing methodologies required by CMS. For example, calculating and reporting AMP under Medicaid vs. calculating and reporting Average Sales Price (ASP) under Medicare Part B.

Financial Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Companies:

The new DRA policies also pose significant financial challenges for pharma companies. For example:

Compliance Challenges of DRA for Drug Manufacturers:

The DRA changes present new or expanded compliance challenges for drug manufacturers. Given the frequency, changes, and overall complexity, there are many ways to inadvertently screw up federal reporting. Ensuring compliance will require heavy reliance on other parts of company and on external partners. Transparency of pricing will likely lead to new regulations, audits, and Congressional hearings. Finally, while over time DRA reporting may make it easier to defend against suits, companies should expect dramatic increase in whistleblower suits under federal and state False Claims Acts.

Learn More:

For the DRA statutory changes affecting drug pricing, click here (PDF).

For the proposed rule, click here (PDF). For CMS' fact sheet on the proposed rule, click here (PDF).

Read the OIG's recommendations to the HHS Secretary on DRA implementation issues. The OIG report includes useful background information.

For more information or a briefing, feel free to contact me.

There's a lot of truth in the old joke about the problem with Republicans and Democrats: Republicans need a heart and Democrats need a brain. As Democrats prepare to take control of Congress, they appear eager to prove the joke by pursuing legislation to require government "negotiations" on prescription drug prices in Medicare Part D.

The idea has emotional appeal, so let's see if there is any evidence to support the idea. (If you come from the Bumper Sticker School of Health Policy, stop here. The facts will only confuse you and don't easily make for emotive talking points.)

Non-Interference Requirement in MMA:

In the Medicare Moderation Act, the massive 2003 legislation that created the Medicare Part D drug benefit among other Medicare reforms, Congress prohibited the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from interfering with drug pricing in the competitive market. Part D prescription drug plans - Medicare Advantage drug plans (MA-PDs) and prescription drug plans (PDPs) - would battle among themselves to cut the best deals with pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies and openly compete for enrollees.

The statute at controversy, found at section 1860D-11(i) of the Social Security Act, is short and sweet:

(i) NONINTERFERENCE. In order to promote competition under this part and in carrying out this part, the Secretary:

(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and

(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.

Estimated Savings of Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Supporters of federal staff negotiating drug prices argue that it would generate billions of dollars in savings for taxpayers and seniors. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - the highly respected, non-partisan fiscal advisor to both houses of Congress and the agency that officially scores the cost and savings of all legislative proposals - agrees with top health economists and Medicare experts that federal price negotiations will save precisely zip.

Following passage of MMA, Senate leaders asked CBO to examine the effect of striking the 'noninterference' provision. CBO reported:

We estimate that striking that provision would have a negligible effect on federal spending because CBO estimates that substantial savings will be obtained by the private plans and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree. Because they will be at substantial financial risk, private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts, both to control their own costs in providing the drug benefit and to attract enrollees with low premiums and cost-sharing requirements.

CBO was then asked if the federal government could save anything if CMS centrally negotiated prices with makers of single-source drugs. (Single-source prescription drugs are brand-name drugs that have no generic equivalent on the market and are generally available from only one manufacturer.) Again, CBO concluded that savings are unlikely, unless of course federal officials are willing to play hardball and restrict patient access to therapeutically unique drugs until the manufacturers agree to government price demands:

Most single-source drugs face competition from other drugs that are therapeutic alternatives. CBO believes that there is little, if any, potential savings from negotiations involving those single-source drugs. We expect that risk-bearing private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts for such drugs and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree.

Nevertheless, there is potential for some savings if the Secretary were to have the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of single-source drugs that do not face competition from therapeutic alternatives. Private plans offering a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries will have less leverage in negotiating discounts for drugs without therapeutic alternatives than they have in price negotiations for drugs that do face such competition. (In that regard, the Medicare plans will be no different than private health plans that offer prescription drug coverage to other populations.)

Under current law, there already are significant pressures that limit the prices that manufacturers charge for drugs - whether those drugs face competition from therapeutic alternatives or not. Those pressures include the prospects that plans will not cover a drug (or will substantially limit the amount they pay for a drug) and that manufacturers will provoke a backlash (potentially including legislation) if they set prices too high. Moreover, the creation of the Medicare drug benefit has given federal officials greater opportunity and incentive than under prior law to bring pressure on manufacturers - for example, by influencing public opinion and policy makers--if the prices that manufacturers set for single-source drugs that are not subject to competition from therapeutic alternatives are perceived as being too high. Giving the Secretary an additional tool--the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of such drugs - would put greater pressure on those manufacturers and could produce some additional savings.

Ample Evidence Against Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Not only would federal price negotiations save little or nothing compared to the increasingly competitive private marketplace, there are host of other arguments against the idea.

In a fascinating new study - The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and Pharmaceutical Innovation - Benjamin Zycher, Ph.D., an economist and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Medical Progress, carefully "estimates the impact that federal negotiation of prescription drug prices would have on pharmaceutical research and development (R & D) investment through 2025."

Dr. Zycher concludes that, while federal price negotiations could save some Medicare dollars, "the longer-term human costs of government price-negotiation...are likely to be large and adverse." Most notably, the data show government mandated negotiations would dramatically reduce the development of new, life-saving drugs (about a dozen annually), resulting in "...a loss of 5 million expected life-years annually, an adverse effect that can be valued conservatively at about $500 billion per year, an amount far in excess of total annual U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals."

In Compromising Quality: The High Cost of Government Drug Purchasing, Edmund F. Haislmaier provides a crisp, devastating critique of the idea of federal drug price negotiations. He disects the core myths and outlines how it would only serve to threaten quality and access.

Proponents of government price negotiations assume that Medicare has more bargaining leverage than the private sector. In Why the New Congress Should Not Fix Drug Prices, researcher Greg D'Angelo does a nice job dismantling this faulty assumption.

Wait, It Gets Worse:

Many advocates of federal negotiations point to the VA's prescription drug program as an example of how to reduce drug prices. As I have explained to many audiences, comparing the VA approach to Medicare Part D is not even an apples to oranges comparison. It's more like comparing apples and poodles - and makes as much sense.

A groundbreaking study, by Frank R. Lichtenberg, Ph.D. of the Columbia School of Business, should put such comparisons to rest. In Older Drugs, Shorter Lives? An Examination of the Health Effects of the Veterans Health Administration Formulary, Dr. Lichtenberg shows the VH approach is not about prices or genuine negotiations. With the VA's tight budget, it is all about restricting veterans' access to new (and many old) medications to save dollars and hit budget targets.

The VA's highly restrictive national formulary excludes 62% of drugs approved by the FDA during the 1990's and 81% of new medications approved since 2000. Even worse, the drug benefit designed for our nation's veterans does not pay for a staggering 78% of new, high-priority prescription drugs approved by the FDA on an expedited basis since 1997 because of their life-saving impact. By comparison, commercial health plans, Medicare Part D drug plans, and state Medicaid programs cover the vast majority of new drugs and move quick to add coverage for most drugs given fast-track by the FDA.

Dr. Lichtenberg's 2005 study shows that the VA's prescription drug system - seen by many as the "model" for Medicare Part D - reduced the life span and survival rates of vets since its 1997 introduction. Note to Congress: Death is always cheaper than life but rarely preferable.

Recap:

So, let's recap. Even putting aside the dangers of a massive increase in government power, fact it would dramatically reduce consumer and physician decision making, fact it would shift costs to other payors, and fact it would inevitably lead to economically disastrous price controls, the federal government negotiating drug prices will likely save little or nothing - unless Congress wants to severely restrict patient access to new and existing medications, thereby shortening lives, reducing quality of life, and increasing costs well beyond any savings. And that's if it's even feasible for CMS to do it. Trust me, it's not.

Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans (MA-SNPs) are a fast growing innovation in the marketplace. A new Medicare managed care option created under the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), MA-SNPs are able to tailor plan designs and delivery to serve the needs of dual eligibles, beneficiaries in nursing homes or at risk of institutionalization, and beneficiaries with chronic, severe conditions.

For CY 2006, there are 276 federally approved MA-SNPs with an enrollment of over 500,000. More insurers are jumping in to offer Special Needs Plans in 2007 and others are moving to market the new plans to millions of high-cost, high-need Medicare beneficiaries. Given this competition and the many advantages of MA-SNPs for dual eligibles and other chronically ill beneficiaries, MA-SNP should exceed one million in 2007 and two million in 2008.

As I reported earlier, states and CMS are working to dovetail Medicare's requirements for MA-SNPs and state and federal requirements for Medicaid managed care organizations (MMCOs). The objective is to provide states with an exciting new voluntary option to integrate health care for the nation's 6.3 million dual eligibles.

In close collaboration with the National Association of State Medicaid Directors (NASMD), CMS has released a new guide for states on integrating Medicaid and Medicare services and a series of how-to guides on integrating enrollment, marketing, and quality assurance.

To learn more about MA-SNPs or integrated Medicare-Medicaid health plans, check out my earlier posts or contact me for more resources.

The world's leading guru of competitive strategy, Michael Porter, Ph.D., has turned his sights on explaining the fundamental cause of high costs, poor quality, consumer dissatisfaction, uneven access, and skyrocketing premiums in American health care.

In Redefining Health Care, Porter and innovation expert Elizabeth Teisberg, Ph.D. provide a thoughtful, groundbreaking framework to use competition to drive dramatic increases in quality and efficiency.

Unlike many wonks who foolishly believe that health care is not a market, Drs. Porter and Teisberg see competition " of a sort " in operation. They show us that the current competitive environment in health care is designed to "shift costs, accumulate bargaining power, and restrict services." That is, what we have now is dysfunctional, zero-sum competition serving to limit, even reduce value for patients. And they see all this taking place "...at the wrong level-among health plans, networks, and hospitals " rather than where it matters most, in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of specific health conditions."

Focusing on how to move American health care to positive-sum competition based on economic and clinical value for patients, Redefining Health Care provides a series of specific recommendations for the key players " including physicians, hospitals, health plans, employers, Medicare, and Medicaid.

To learn about the Massachusetts health care reform initiative, here are two podcasts on this groundbreaking new program to cover virtually all the uninsured in the Commonwealth.

For Sellers, Feinberg and Associates, the lead consultants on the Massachusetts reform project, I host a biweekly podcast on hot issues in Medicaid. These concise audio briefings help state leaders and business executives keep tabs with Medicaid on Capitol Hill and CMS.

In Part 1 of the special audio briefing on the Massachusetts health reform initiative, Marty Sellers, President and founder of Sellers Feinberg, describes the key components of the Massachusetts initiative, how it was developed, and implications for other states and the healthcare market.

In Part 2, Peggy Handrich, the former Wisconsin Medicaid director and now leader of Sellers Feinberg's strategic Medicaid consulting practice, describes the key financial and programmatic characteristics of the Massachusetts health reform.

To listen directly on your computer, click here for Part 1 and here for Part 2. The podcasts are in the popular MP3 format, so you may also right-click to save and upload them to your iPod or other MP3 player for listening on the road.

For a useful two-page fact sheet on the Massachusetts health care reform plan, click here (PDF).

To subscribe to receive the free podcasts on Medicaid, please contact Sellers Feinberg. The folks there are working with a number of other states on health reform and Medicaid restructuring initiatives.

Being a Medicare prescription drug plan can be a profitable business. For the smart players, it will be highly profitable over time and indispensable to market position. But Medicare Part D can also be financially risky and volatile - particularly given:

It is an immutable truth of economics. Transparency is an essential ingredient for a market to function with any semblance of efficiency or effectiveness. Lack of transparency - what economists call asynchronous information - leads to rapid inflation, gross inefficiency, gaming and abuse, ignorant consumers, poor quality, rampant error rates, and misaligned resources. In other words, you get America's $1.9 trillion health care system.

After years of behind the scenes work by top health care thought leaders, the White House and key Congressional leaders are jumping on board and calling for reforms to ensure transparency (read public reporting) of health care provider prices. While prices are only part of the information needs of patients, purchasers, and payors, nationwide transparency of medical prices is essential. Health Savings Accounts and other consumer-driven health reforms such as Medicaid Health Opportunity Accounts are largely pointless in a health care system otherwise rooted in incomplete, inaccurate, and inaccessible information.

As leaders contemplate specific measures to promote transparency of prices, they should also consider sending every Medicaid and Medicare beneficiary a quarterly report on the cost of their care. (I am not talking about Explanation of Benefits [EOB] notices. EOBs don't give a picture of their overall costs or utilization and offer no comparative, trend, or historical information.)

Using simple, colorful charts and tables and an emphasis on decision relevant information, a well-designed report would show them what care they received, what providers charged, what public programs paid, how much they paid in cost sharing, and how their medical costs compare to their peers (age group, sex, health status, and geography).

For Medicare beneficiaries, the reports could help bust a core myth of Medicare financing by showing what Medicare has paid for their care compared to what as an individual they paid in Medicare taxes and cost-sharing to date. In Medicaid, the reports would be invaluable to state efforts to move toward consumer-directed models where chronically ill or disabled patients and their families take active control of their medical lives. It would also help low-income families better understand the health care system. For dual eligibles - the 6.3 million Americans with annual health costs of a quarter trillion dollars - these personalized reports would be truly eye opening for patients and their families.

Over time, the reports could help Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries see how their providers, health plans, and drug plans compare on measures of quality, errors, and cost effectiveness. And they could include simple health reminders.

Of course, not every benie would read the reports much less change their behavior based on the information. But the vary act of creating the reports would require Medicare and Medicaid to modernize information systems, turn transaction data into genuine decision-relevant information, and begin thinking of program beneficiaries as consumers in need of more than monstrously dull doorstops masquerading as handbooks.

Americans, including Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries, are not stupid. But when it comes to health care costs, they are too often ignorant or oblivious. That must stop. Yes, there is a learning curve and some people prefer the bliss of ignorance to the dilemmas of judgment. Nonetheless, as consumers, as Americans, as human beings we are entitled to the information we need to make decisions. Keeping Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and their families in the dark is as costly as it is insulting.

Coming on the heels of Medicare Part D and the new Part B drug-pricing schema based on Average Sales Price (ASP), the new Competitive Acquisition Program (CAP) for Medicare Part B drugs and biologics represents yet another major change to the pharmaceutical supply chain. While it is too early to reliably predict the impact or even viability of CAP, it's critical for players to understand the initiative. Ultimately, CAP may have a dramatic impact on drug manufacturers, distributors, physicians, and beneficiaries.

Road to Average Sales Price (ASP):

While Medicare Part B drug coverage is complex, generally speaking Part B drug coverage is limited to physician-administered drugs and therefore primarily injectibles. Prior to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Medicare reimbursed physician offices for Part B drugs based on percentages of Average Wholesale Price (AWP). Physicians would buy what they need, administer drugs to patients as necessary, charge beneficiaries for their deductible and 20% Part B co-payment, and bill Medicare for the drug and the office visit.

This approach was widely criticized by MedPAC, GAO, and the OIG as well as outside experts. Under the AWP-based system, Medicare drug payments were far higher than other payors. It also meant higher patient co-payments. However, in fairness to physicians, in many ways the higher drug reimbursement helped make up for Medicare's below-market office visit rates.

Under MMA, Congress changed that way Medicare reimburses physicians for drugs and biologics covered under Medicare Part B. Since January 2005, Medicare reimburses physicians using a new formula based on Average Sales Price (ASP). For most Part B drugs, physician offices are now paid 106% of ASP.

In brief, ASP is what a pharma or biotechnology company makes on a given product, net of rebates and other price concessions. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates ASP using net sales data provided by drug makers. Medicare adds 6% to help cover physicians' costs of buying, storing, and billing. The new ASP-based payment system results in substantial savings to Medicare but of course also lower revenues for physicians.

Basics of the Competitive Acquisition Program (CAP):

Starting in July 2006, physicians will have an alternative to buying and billing for Part B drugs and ASP-based payment. The upcoming Competitive Acquisition Program (CAP) will give physicians the option of obtaining most Part B drugs needed by Medicare patients from vendors selected by CMS. Medicare physicians may elect to participate in CAP on an annual basis.

The CMS-approved vendors, selected through competitive bidding, will negotiate with manufacturers, buy and distribute supplies to physicians, bill beneficiaries for any applicable deductible and coinsurance, and bill Medicare's designated national carrier for drug costs. The carrier will pay the CAP vendor after verifying that the physician administered the drug. To do this, the carrier will match the CAP vendor's claim for the drug with the corresponding physician claim for drug administration. Following this verification, the CAP vendor will bill the beneficiary (or the beneficiary's Medigap policy or other third party insurance) for applicable cost sharing.

For the Part B drug categories they have selected, physicians opting for CAP will receive all of those drugs (used for Medicare patients) from the approved CAP vendor. Physician offices participating in CAP will continue to bill Medicare as usual for the drug administration fee and other office fees.

Under certain conditions, a participating CAP physician may provide a drug to a Medicare beneficiary from his or her own stock and obtain the replacement drug from the CAP vendor. There is also an exception for "furnish as written" situations when the physician specifies that a certain brand of a drug is medically necessary and that drug is not available from the CAP vendor. In those cases, the participating CAP physician may buy the drug, administer it to the beneficiary, and bill Medicare using the ASP system.

CAP Bidding and Contracting:

Every three years, CMS will solicit bids from qualifying vendors - primarily major distributors and specialty pharmacy shops. MMA gives CMS the authority to select drugs or categories of drugs that will be included in the program. Drugs may be excluded from the CAP if competition will not result in significant savings compared to the ASP system or when necessary to avoid disruption in access to a drug.

In April, CMS is expected to announce the CAP vendors for the program's July 1, 2006 start.

Market Implications of CAP:

In an upcoming story, I will comment on the implications of CAP for drug manufacturers, drug distributors, and physicians.

Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans (MA-SNPs) are an important new innovation in the healthcare marketplace. Ultimately, as I reported last fall in the Piper Report, MA-SNPs may evolve to serve an untapped $250 billion market. Here's a quick briefing on Special Needs Plans and how they become integrated Medicaid / Medicare health plans:

Brief History of Medicare Managed Care:

Since 1970's, Medicare has included an HMO option as alternative to receiving all Medicare Part A and Part B services from traditional fee-for-service Medicare. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) renamed Medicare managed care to "Medicare+Choice" and added a new range of options for Medicare beneficiaries: preferred provider organizations (PPOs), provider-sponsored organizations (PSOs), private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, and Medical savings accounts (MSAs) linked with high deductible insurance plans.

Medicare Modernization Act of 2003:

In addition to creating the new Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) renamed Medicare+Choice to "Medicare Advantage" (MA) and created new MA plan options for beneficiaries - regional preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and "Special Needs Plans" for dual eligibles, the institutionalized, or those with severe and disabling conditions. MMA also created new incentives for health plan participation in the over $300 billion Medicare market, most notably risk adjustment to Medicare Advantage plan premiums and increased Medicare Advantage plan premiums.

Basics of Medicare Advantage:

The Medicare Advantage program is governed under Medicare Part C, which refers to Part C of Title XVIII of the federal Social Security Act. Medicare Advantage (MA) plans provide all Medicare-covered benefits under Part A and Part B and serve as an alternative to traditional Medicare fee-for-service. Most kinds of MA plans (including all the most popular ones) must also offer a voluntary drug benefit under Part D.

This way, beneficiaries may get all Medicare-covered benefits (Part A, Part B, and Part D) through one health plan. If a benie wants to sign up for Part D but stay in unmanaged fee-for-service for Part A and B services, they must enroll in a stand-alone prescription drug plan (PDP) to receive Medicare drug coverage. (Part D thankfully does not have a government-run fee-for-service option.)

Part D is major draw for new Medicare Advantage enrollment. Compared to the alternative (fee-for-service for Part A and Part B benefits and a stand-alone prescription drug plan for Part D benefit), Medicare Advantage plans are able to offer lower cost sharing, more benefits, fewer hassles, and higher performing mix of providers. However, because they have higher expectations regarding provider quality and cost-effectiveness, Medicare Advantage plans (particularly HMO-based plans) tend to offer a narrower choice of providers than Medicare fee-for-service.

Medicare Advantage Enrollment:

More private insurers are participating in Medicare than ever - 459 approved Medicare Advantage plans, up from 247 in 2005. Currently, over 14% of beneficiaries (6+ million) are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans - up from 12% (4.9 million) in 2005. Plan enrollment varies widely state to state, with the highest penetration (20% to 30%+) in AZ, CA, CO, OR, PA, and RI.

Long-range projections of Medicare Advantage enrollment vary widely. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) believes that by 2013 30% of Medicare beneficiaries will be enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that 16% of beneficiaries will be in a Medicare Advantage plan by 2013. At the current path, MA plan enrollment should exceed 16% in 2006.

Medicare Advantage Premiums:

Medicare uses a complex system to calculate plan premiums, blending administrative pricing with competitive bidding, market benchmarking, and risk adjustment. There are separate bidding and rate-setting processes for Parts A/B and Part D.

For example, for the Part A and Part B portion of Medicare Advantage plan payments, Medicare uses a benchmarking process to compare bids and leverage competition to maximize value for beneficiaries and taxpayers. If a plan's bid is above benchmark, enrollees in that plan pay the difference. If lower, 75% of difference goes to enrollees as extra benefits or lower cost sharing (or a reserve fund) and 25% goes to Medicare.

Basics of Special Needs Plans:

Prior to MMA, Medicare health plans were required to market generally to the Medicare population in their geographic service area and could not limit enrollment to specific population. Under the new Special Needs Plan option, insurers may propose a Medicare Advantage plan that is restricted to a special needs population either exclusively or disproportionately.

The ability to separately market and enroll special needs populations - coupled with Part D and risk adjustment - has created significant interest in this market. It's important to note that authority for Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans (MA-SNPs) expires in December 2008. Therefore, Congressional action required to continue after 2008.

Target Populations for Special Needs Plans:

Under MMA, there are three target populations for Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans:

1. Institutionalized Beneficiaries (~3.5 million): Medicare beneficiaries who reside or are expected to reside for 90 days or longer in a long-term care facility. Also includes Medicare beneficiaries who live in the community but who require an equivalent level of care to those residing in a long-term care facility.

2. Dually Eligible beneficiaries (~7.5 million): Medicare beneficiaries who are also in Medicaid for full Medicaid benefits (~6.2 million) and low-income Medicare beneficiaries who receive subsidies from their state Medicaid program for their Medicare cost sharing (~1.3 million in QMB, SLIM, or QI programs).

3. Medicare Beneficiaries with Chronic, Severe Conditions (~millions more): The feds are particularly interested in MA-SNPs designed to serve Medicare beneficiaries with cardiovascular disease, diabetes, congestive heart failure, osteoarthritis, mental disorders, end-stage renal disease (ESRD), and/or HIV/AIDS. However, there is no preset definition for this target group. CMS evaluates MA-SNP proposals on case-by-case basis. CMS focuses on appropriateness of the target population, clinical programs and special expertise of the MA-SNP, and how the MA-SNP will cover full target population it specifies without discriminating against "sicker" members.

Basics of Dual Eligibles:

Health care spending for dual eligibles now hovers at a massive quarter trillion dollars - about 60% provided by Medicaid and 40% from Medicare. While dual eligibles drive over a quarter of all Medicare costs, dual eligibles drive over 40% of state Medicaid budgets. (For variety of reasons, including different definitions of duals and accounting for Part D costs, estimates vary. For example, when talking about "dual eligibles" some wonks are referring to the 6.2 million full-benefit duals. Other times the term refers to both the full-benefit folks plus the 1.3 million Medicare-only beneficiaries with partial Medicaid subsidy.)

Dual eligibles are a vulnerable, high cost population in desperate need of coordinated care. About 2/3 live in community and 1/3 reside in long-term care facilities. They commonly have multiple morbidities (5-8) and some 45% have severe mental illness. Compared to the overall Medicare population, they are lower income, older, disproportionately female, disproportionately minority, and less educated. They are often live highly isolated lives, with little or no support system.

MA-SNP Market for 2006:

Since passage of MMA, the number of approved Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans (MA-SNPs) has steadily increased, from 11 in 2004 to 276 in 2006. Of the 276 MA-SNPs approved for CY 2006, 226 are designed for dual eligibles, 37 for beneficiaries with institutional level of care, and 13 for specific chronic conditions (e.g., ESRD). One or more MA-SNPs now operating in most states: AL, AZ, AK, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY,LA, ME, MD, DE, MA, RI, MI, MN, MO, MS, NE, NE, NV, PA,NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, PR, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WI.

Integrating Medicaid and Medicare via MA-SNPs:

Historically, integration of health care for dual eligibles has been a major challenge. Medicaid and Medicare vary radically in financing, coverage policies, delivery systems, beneficiary rights, and day-to-day administration. For dual eligibles, this results in misaligned benefit structures, little or no care coordination, lower quality, over and under utilization, huge opportunities for cost-shifting, and seemingly endless conflicts between the feds and states. The human and economics costs are extraordinary.

While created to serve the Medicare side of the market, Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans create new opportunities to integrate Medicaid and Medicare coverage for dual eligibles. Last fall, I laid out the rationale here in the Piper Report (click to read that story). The idea is picking up steam, generating considerable interest from states and health plans.

Basics of Integrated Medicaid-Medicare Health Plan:

In brief, here's how it could work. A health plan contracts with both Medicare (with CMS as a MA-SNP) and the state Medicaid program. For its dual eligible enrollees, the plan is then responsible for all Medicare and Medicaid benefits. The integrated Medicare-Medicaid plan would also be responsible for coordinating benefits with other payors like VA.

The combined Medicaid / MA-SNP would receive fully capitated, risk adjusted premiums for (1) Medicare Part A and Part B (MA plan bidding and benchmarking), (2) Medicare Part D drug benefit (MA-PD bidding and benchmarking), (3) Medicaid benefits (actuarially determined, with bid or proposal process determined by the state), and (4) state Medicaid payment for Medicare cost sharing. The state Medicaid program could create incentives to encourage dual eligibles to enroll in integrated plans. For example, the state could limit coverage of popular home- and community-based long-term care services to duals enrolled in integrated plans.

With some grant support from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, five states are developing concept: Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Washington. To make integrated Medicaid / Medicare plans practicable, they are working to standardize and simplify: (1) plan rate setting and risk-adjustment; (2) performance standards, measurement, and reporting; (3) grievance and appeal procedures; (4) marketing guidelines; and (5) state contracting processes with MA-SNPs.

As promised, here's my list of likely losers under the new Medicare prescription drug benefit:

● Dual Eligibles: These 6.5 million highly vulnerable beneficiaries will lose their Medicaid drug benefit and be enrolled in the less generous, slightly more expensive, far more complex Medicare drug benefit. They also face the likelihood of a dangerous transition in drug therapy. If there is a silver lining here, it's the prospect of Medicare Advantage Special Needs Plans (MA-SNPs). That is, the hope that over time dual Medicare-Medicaid beneficiaries will sign up to get all their Medicare benefits from health plans tailored to their needs. Even better states work with MA-SNPs to bundle all Medicaid services with Medicare Part A, Part B, and Part D. See my earlier post on this idea and other stories on dual eligible issues.

● Retirees with Employer-Sponsored Drug Coverage: The trend has certainly been toward employers reducing retiree health coverage. With $100 billion in new taxpayer-financed incentives and an array of options to cost shift, Medicare Part D ensures that millions of retirees will move - slowly but inevitably - from relatively generous employer-sponsored drug coverage to more limited, more costly taxpayer-subsidized coverage. Employers are in a bind, to be sure, so don't blame them for taking advantage of this gift horse. It's anyone's guess whether Part D and the $100 billion in subsidies for employers will serve to slow or hasten the death of employer-sponsored drug coverage for retirees.

● States: Because of the now notorious "clawback" and variety of other factors, including a likely strong woodwork effect, loss of supplemental rebates, and unfunded mandates, drug benefits for dual eligibles will cost cash-stripped state governments more under federal management. Under Part D and the resulting fragmentation of benefits across multiple, uncoordinated programs, state Medicaid programs also lose critically important data and face greater challenges to managing the health costs of the most expensive, most vulnerable Medicaid beneficiaries. Since it's highly likely that many dual eligibles will have problems getting their prescriptions in the early months of Part D, states may be forced to step in and use their own money to cover drugs as the bugs are worked out.

● Community Pharmacies: The shift of dual eligibles to Medicare for their prescription drugs also means a large chunk of retail pharmacy business is moving from Medicaid (which, in most states, is the highest payor of pharmacy services) to private drug plans (which are the lowest payors). Specifically, state Medicaid programs commonly pay much higher dispensing fees and pay a higher rate for a pharmacy's drug acquisition costs. Commercial insurers, including those offering Medicare drug plans, are just the opposite. States do get better deals from drug manufacturers because of rebates and the Medicaid "best price" law, but those dollars are on the backend and pharmacies don't benefit. The large drug store chains have some flexibility to juggle the business impact of Part D. However, many small independent pharmacies face significant financial losses.

● Big Pharma: Some, perhaps most, pharmaceutical manufacturers will see a temporary boost in their top lines. Yet, most will experience a significant and likely steady, long-lasting hit to the bottom line. Yes, some drug makers will benefit from the pent-up demand released by the Medicare drug benefit. But the potential for increased sales in the short term is nothing compared to pricing pressures generated by the confluence of market dynamics, including drug plan competition, price transparency, and price sensitivity of at-risk drug plans. Add to this the likelihood of a massive increase in government oversight, substantially higher compliance risks, and challenges of shifting from a sales-based to research-based strategy. Some drug makers will win but it will depend on how quickly and deftly they can adapt to a brave new world of Part D.

Please check out my previous post on the Medicare drug benefit, including post on the likely winners in the business of Part D.

The new Medicare prescription drug benefit presents major marketing challenges for both the competing drug plans and officials at CMS and SSA. While the feds must conduct a massive outreach campaign to educate 43 million Medicare beneficiaries about the complex program, the drug plan sponsors must market their plan designs, which vary widely in delivery, cost sharing, and formularies.

With over 2,000 drug plan options across the country and each beneficiary having to select among 40-50+ plan designs in their own regions, the marketing challenges are extraordinary. Add to this the intricate, anti-intuitive program design set up by Congress in the Medicare Modernization Act and how Part D handles the dual eligibles, low-income seniors, retirees with employer sponsored drug coverage, veterans, and others all differently - and, well, you have the makings of quite a mess.

Yet, the challenges don't end there. The Medicare population is not homogeneous, media stereotypes notwithstanding. Beneficiaries vary widely by income, assets, age, disability status, setting, ethnicity, and existing drug coverage. Almost 70 percent already have prescription drug coverage without Part D. Those without drug coverage are a diverse mix of rich and poor, healthy and sick, active and isolated, urban and rural. As a group, American seniors are one of the wealthiest cohorts in world history but among them, there are many low-income seniors struggling every day.

In terms of race and ethnicity, African Americans and Latinos make up 15 percent of Medicare's beneficiaries ages 65 and older and 27 percent of Medicare's under-65 disabled beneficiaries. However, while less than a third of white beneficiaries are sufficiently low in income to qualify for federal drug subsidies, over 60 percent of African Americans and Latinos on Medicare may qualify for the low-income subsidy. While a sizable majority of all Medicare beneficiaries have access to drug coverage without Part D, African American and Latino beneficiaries are more likely to have no drug coverage now. In addition, the vulnerable dual eligible population, with its 6.5 million souls, is disproportionately African American or Latino beneficiaries.

Traditional, television-centric marketing tactics are necessary but not sufficient to reach Medicare's diverse population and offer the benefits of Part D, particularly the substantial savings available through the low-income subsidy. To differentiate themselves in a crowded market and maximize both enrollment and retention, Medicare prescription drug plans need to adopt a more sophisticated, multi-facetted array of marketing tactics and mediums. Among them, viral or word-of-mouth marketing is essential. In addition to being extremely effective in situations like this, the costs and risks are low.

Medicare Advantage is the new name for voluntary managed care options in Medicare (also know as Medicare Part C and formerly "Medicare+Choice"). Medicare Advantage plans are now available in nearly every area of the country. Beneficiaries who select a MA plan elect to receive all Medicare benefits through the health plan (HMO or PPO). This includes all Part A and Part B services, plus the new Part D drug benefit as an optional add-on.

The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) created a Medicare Advantage option called "specialized MA plans for special needs individuals" ("special needs plans" or "SNPs"). These Medicare health plans limit their enrollment to special needs beneficiaries (or disproportionate percentage of special needs beneficiaries). The idea is to encourage greater access to Medicare Advantage plans for special needs individuals and allow plans to tailor programs to meet unique needs. MMA also created risk adjustment, removing a major disincentive to serve high-cost populations. Two groups of special needs individuals are specified in MMA: (1) beneficiaries who are institutionalized and (2) dual eligibles. CMS may also establish other "special needs" groups among beneficiaries with severe or disabling chronic conditions. Like other Medicare Advantage plans, special needs plans have the ability to lower beneficiary cost sharing and cover services not available to beneficiaries in fee-for-service Medicare.

This creates a new opportunity for state Medicaid programs to extend the benefits of managed care to dual eligibles, who nationwide account for over 40 percent of Medicaid costs. Because of a labyrinth of conflicts between federal Medicare and Medicaid laws, it has been very hard for states to implement large-scale programs to improve care delivery for their highest cost, most vulnerable beneficiaries. The result has been high costs, extraordinary inefficiency, frustration for patients and their families, and higher risk for poor quality.

Working with CMS and Medicare Advantage special needs plans (MA-SNPs) operating in the state, a state Medicaid agency could offer to capitate all Medicaid services to any MA-SNP with dual eligible enrollees. The MA-SNP would then be responsible for all Medicare and Medicaid benefits, including all long-term care and prescription drug benefits. To ensure appropriate payment and oversight, the state would risk adjust the Medicaid side of the capitation and MA-SNPs would have one set of quality standards and grievance procedures (presumably based on the more stringent Medicaid protections). Enrollment would remain voluntary like it is for other Medicare beneficiaries, but states could create powerful incentives for duals to enroll in MA-SNPs. For example, the state could limit coverage of home- and community-based services (HCBS) to MA-SNP enrollees when two or more MA-SNPs are available.

Beneficiaries would benefit from higher quality, better access (in real terms), modern care coordination, less paperwork, closer oversight of their rights, and likely more services. States would win from a range of benefit and administrative savings, plus more predictable spending.

For a fact sheet on Medicare Advantage, click here. To learn about plans, enrollment, and other key issues, click here.

The health care sector is poised for more mergers and acquisitions, particularly in health plan and biotechnology segments. UnitedHealth Group's deal PacifiCare is only the beginning of a hot M&A season the next couple years.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are often essential to a company's growth and viability. However, a staggering 70 percent of mergers fail, often with devastating consequences for all concerned. For healthcare executives contemplating a deal, Mastering the Merger is filled with excellent, actionable advice. It is written in a tight, compelling way that business leaders will find quite useful.

Mastering the Merger focuses on the importance of due diligence well before targets are identified and M&A decisions are made. Specifically, it describes:

1. The most important questions prospective acquirers must ask before consummating any deal, regardless of size. Here the authors show executives how to ask and answer the big questions.

2. Strategies and tactics to effectively target acquisitions and close deals.

3. How to decide which aspects of a newly acquired business to leave independent and which to integrate. The authors focus here on how to integrate quickly but where it matters.

4. How to anticipate and deal with contingencies. The emphasis is on how to predict and manage the unexpected.

Authors David Harding and Sam Rovit are partners at Bain and Company and write often for the Harvard Business Review. Bain and Company is an elite business consulting firm that specializes in increasing the underlying market value of companies. Because successful mergers are a key method of increasing a company's value, Harding and Rovit are in an excellent position to share what works and what does not.