The next President and Congress will face many fiscal and policy challenges from the $436 billion Medicare program. Following my earlier quick primers on Medicaid policy making and Medicare and Medicaid waivers, here is a similar briefing on the primary vehicles of Medicare policy making.

As a federal health program operating nationwide, Medicare policies are made through:

Federal Medicare Statutes:

Title XVIII of the Social Security Act sets forth the bulk of federal Medicare laws. Given the political importance and visibility of Medicare, Medicare statutes are extremely specific, especially on provider reimbursement, benefits, cost sharing, managed care, and provider conditions of participation. Therefore, CMS' rulemaking discretion is often limited.

In the House, the Ways and Means Committee has primary jurisdiction over Medicare but often shares jurisdiction on certain issues with the Energy and Commerce Committee. In the Senate, the Finance Committee has primary jurisdiction for Medicare. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) advises Congress on Medicare issues and often proposes major policy changes. Like with Medicaid, Medicare legislative changes are typically accomplished through budget reconciliation bills rather than separate stand-alone legislation.

Federal Medicare Rules:

Most federal Medicare rules are promulgated by CMS (42 CFR Part 400 through 429). CMS must follow the same rulemaking and clearance processes for federal Medicaid rules. Medicare rules are developed by the relevant operating center or office with CMS, such as the Center for Medicare Management (CMM) for fee-for-service Part A and Part B issues and the Center for Drug and Health Plan Choice (CDHPC) for Part D and Medicare Advantage issues. Legal advice comes from the HHS Office of General Counsel (OGC).

Before publication in the Federal Register, all proposed and final rules require approval of the HHS Secretary and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB's Medicare rule reviews are conducted primarily by the Medicare Branch in OMB's Health Division.

Federal Medicare Guidance:

CMS uses numerous vehicles to convey Medicare guidance, including tens of thousands of pages of manuals, instructions, and program transmittals to contractors, providers, suppliers, health plans, and drug plans. Within the framework of the statutes and rules, considerable operational and technical policy is also set through the Medicare Advantage and Part D drug benefit applications, bids, and contracts.

Unlike in Medicaid - where CMS is often criticized for setting substantive policy through sub-regulatory guidance - Medicare guidance is more a product of a layering effect of highly specific statutes and regulations. Therefore, the Medicare administrative guidance focuses on execution issues, operational details (e.g., coding), and clarifications within and across the four complex, sometime conflicting parts of Medicare.

Under a new Executive Order, OMB now has the right to prior review and approval of CMS guidance, particularly any sub-regulatory guidance involving issues about $100 million, which is virtually anything in Medicare or Medicaid. To learn more, read my earlier post on expansion of OMB's review authority and implications for policy making by CMS and the FDA.

More purchasers and payors are moving away from simplistic cost-driven drug benefit designs to formularies and cost sharing based on value. The impact of value-based drug benefit designs on manufacturers will depend on how quickly individual firms adapt their business thinking and communications strategies.

Until recently, the path to success for a drug manufacturer was based largely on product novelty, physician-centric marketing, and revenue strategies balancing unit prices and concessions against formulary position.

To maximize market share and margins in the world of value-based drug benefit designs, drug manufacturers will need to:

(1) Demonstrate the clinical and economic case for each product and each therapeutic class with an indication,

(2) Build absolute and comparative evidence on a continuous basis,

(3) Develop new value-based pricing models and market partnerships, and

(4) Communicate far more effectively with public and private payors.

For many firms, this will require a significant, even scary change in thinking and tactics; payor-centric communications; comfort with a massive increase in transparency; and a greater willingness to partner. Therefore, while the financial risks of moving to a value-based world are daunting, ultimately the greatest challenges are intellectual.

Value-based drug benefit designs will pose the greatest challenges to manufacturers with product lines (or pipelines) dominated "me too" drugs; rigid, risk-adverse organizational silos; and out-dated, prescriber-centric communications.

The journal Medical Care has published series of outstanding articles on emerging methods and tools to compare the effectiveness of medical therapies, prescription drugs, and devices. The peer-reviewed articles are an outgrowth from a symposium on comparative effectiveness research sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).

Here are links to the individual articles in PDF format:

The well-regarded industry trade journal Biotechnology Healthcare has an excellent article by Patrick Mullen on The Arrival of Average Sales Price. In it, Mr. Mullen interviews several top industry experts (yes, including me) on the rationale for and impact of Average Sales Price (ASP) and how health plans are following Medicare's lead:

Health plans are beginning to adopt the average sales price method of paying oncologists and other specialists for office-administered drugs. ASP is more transparent and has a smaller markup than its much maligned predecessor, average wholesale price. The speed of ASP uptake will affect everyone who makes, sells, prescribes, and takes these medications.

Average Sales Price and Drug Reimbursement:

In 2005, as part of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), the way Medicare Part B reimbursed physicians and clinics for biologics and other physician-administered injectable drugs changed fundamentally. Medicare Part B, the nation's largest payor of injectable drugs, started using Average Sales Price (ASP) to base payments for most drug products covered by Part B fee-for-service.

Using a new, tighter, and more accurate definition of ASP, drug manufacturers must report the Average Sales Price of each of their products. CMS, through its Part B claims processing contractors, reimburses physicians for covered drug products administered to Medicare benies at 106% of ASP, adjusted for volume.

Wide Ranging Impact of ASP in Marketplace:

Physician offices, particularly oncologists, have seen significant drops in Medicare revenue. While the impact on drug makers is mixed, overall the switch to ASP has tightened profit margins and required many manufacturers to revise projections.

Also, like the move of Medicaid to a new and publicly reported version of Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), the ASP reforms are another way drug prices are becoming transparent and flatter or less variable. The transformative effect on business practices and strategy should not be underestimated.

For Medicare Part B, the switch to ASP-based payment has saved billions of dollars and dramatically slowed the growth in Part B prescription drug spending. Beneficiaries have benefited as well, since they are paying the 20% Part B copay on lower prices. However, there is some evidence that some docs are switching drug therapies (which may or may not be clinically optimal for patients) or forcing patients to receive injections from other settings, such as outpatient hospitals. The behavioral effect on physician practices is still hard to discern beyond the realm of anecdote but is something worth monitoring closely, especially in light of low Medicare rates for professional fees.

To Learn More About ASP:

In addition to the article in Biotechnology Healthcare mentioned above, here are some MedPAC resources to understand ASP, Medicare spending on drugs and biologics, and Medicare reimbursement of physician services:

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made major, controversial, and technically complex changes to Medicaid prescription drug pricing and pharmacy reimbursement. The policy changes, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, present significant challenges to both drug manufacturers and retail pharmacies.

To implement the DRA changes, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued final rules that, most notably: (a) revise the definition of average manufacturer price (AMP), (b) create a new formula for calculating Federal Upper Limits (FULs) on multisource drugs, (c) require rebates for certain physician-administered drugs, and (d) clarify rebate liability for authorized generic drugs.

Significant Implications:

For pharmacies, the DRA changes represent significant cuts to Medicaid reimbursement - unless states act to mitigate the changes or increase dispensing fees to compensate for lower product reimbursement. While CMS tried to mitigate the impact on pharmacies, studies by GAO, OIG, and pharmacy trade groups suggest that pharmacies could easily lose money with many drugs dispensed under Medicaid, with the biggest loss in generic drugs.

The changes also hold major implications for pharmaceutical companies. The new policies create new financial, operational, and compliance challenges. They will require most drug makers to rethink pricing strategies and access the impact across all their classes of trade. Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), a calculation that has been a closely held secret under the law since 1991, will become transparent through monthly public reporting of AMP-based prices of every drug on sale in the U.S. You may expect this to have some interesting effects on marketplace behavior and payor negotiations. And, of course, the changes will increase rebate payments to states.

States will benefit from the resulting cost savings. However, state Medicaid directors face strong pressure from community and chain pharmacies to compensate for lost revenue. States also have concerns about the reliability of CMS and pharma industry data, especially in the first couple years given the big change in methodology, scope, and frequency of data reporting. States must also make a variety of systems changes under short notice.

Across the health care system, the DRA changes are further evidence of the increasing power of government policy on the pharmaceutical supply chain. Now that taxpayer-funded health programs pay for the majority of drugs, changes in Medicaid or Medicare drug policy are no longer limited to affected program. Federal changes ripple throughout the industry, forcing changes in commercial practices and business strategy.

Finally, the new rules put a few more nails in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or published prices.

Average Manufacturer Price:

In concept, Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) is the average unit price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the U.S. by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade. (Try to repeat that ten times fast.) However, how this plays out has been highly controversial, leading to inconsistencies across manufacturers, numerous highly critical studies by the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO), allegations of gaming, and countless law suits against drug makers by U.S. attorneys and state attorneys general.

Following the statutory changes made by the DRA, CMS' final rule makes several fundamental changes to AMP. Most notably, the final rule:

Prior to the DRA, sales by a manufacturer of covered outpatient drugs below 10% of AMP were defined as "nominal sales" and generally excluded from Medicaid best price. While the final rule continues to define nominal sales as those sales at less than 10% of AMP, the best price exemption will now be limited to sales to: 340B covered entities, intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF-MRs), and state-owned or operated nursing facilities.

Federal Upper Limits:

For twenty years, the federal rules have limited the amount state Medicaid programs may reimburse pharmacies for generic drugs. Using a Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for each affected drug product, the idea is to help ensure the government is a prudent buyer and pays close to market levels. Before the DRA, the FUL was set at 150% of the published price for the least costly therapeutic equivalent using all available national price compendia.

However, that never worked well. Over time, the old FUL system became very costly to states and problematic for nearly everyone involved.

As a result, the DRA changed the methodology used to establish a FUL on multiple source drugs:

Requirements for Drug Manufacturers:

To accomplish all these changes in AMP and FUL, the law creates new requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers. As I discussed in an earlier post, these new requirements, when coupled with the new approach to AMP, create significant financial, operational, and compliance challenges to pharma companies.

Most notably, pharma companies must:

Rebates on Physician-Administered Drugs:

Before DRA, most States did not collect rebates on physician-administered drugs. Physician drug claims typically did not contain the National Drug Codes (NDCs) necessary for state to invoice drug manufacturers for rebates. Per the DRA, the CMS rule requires states to collect NDC numbers from providers to enable rebate collection on biologics and other physician-administered drugs in Medicaid.

This year, state Medicaid agencies must require providers to submit claims for single source, physician-administered drugs using HCPCS codes or NDC numbers that allow states to bill for rebates. Starting next year, states must require providers to submit claims for single source physician-administered drugs and 20 Secretary-specified, multiple source physician-administered drugs using NDC numbers. States that require additional time to comply may ask for a hardship waiver.

Kerry Weems, Secretary Mike Leavitt's deputy chief of staff and President Bush's nominee to head the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), faces tough Senate confirmation hearings in July. A savvy, career HHS insider with a wealth of experience in the fiscal and organizational mechanics of federal health programs, Mr. Weems is a good choice for an administrator to steer CMS in the last 18 months of the Bush Administration. But he nonetheless faces several serious challenges during the confirmation process. A few examples:

1. Efforts to Hold Confirmation Hostage to Policy Commitments:

Senators, trade groups, and advocates of all flavors have long policy wish lists. As FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D. can attest, the confirmation process - in committee and on the Senate floor - is a unique opportunity for Democrats and even some Republicans to hold up confirmation until the nominee or Department concedes to certain policy demands. And the wish lists for the FDA are nothing compared to what many want from CMS.

2. A Maze of Medicare and Medicaid Controversies:

For better or worse, a wide range of delicate issues at CMS were left unexamined during Republican control of Congress. The Democrats now in charge of the Hill are eager to make political hay with health issues, reshape policy, and give their core constituencies a crack, albeit by proxy, at challenging CMS actions in a public forum.

Regardless of the Administration or the party running the Executive Branch, Medicare and Medicaid are full of dirty little secrets, some real and some imagined, intertwined within a massive level of complexity prone to misconception and manipulation by political foes and those of varying motivations eager for a larger slice of an $800 billion+ pie. Many critics of CMS see the Weems nomination hearings and floor debate as a unique opportunity.

3. Nomination of a Non-Wonk:

While Kerry Weems has a lot going for him and CMS would likely benefit from leadership by a career insider, he is not a health policy wonk. That is, he is not a academic, researcher, health policy maker, or lobbyist (not that most lobbyists are mavens but they like playing them on TV). He's a budget and finance guy and a career one at that. Not a bad thing at all, but a potential problem in a town that grossly overvalues what MD's and PhD's typically know about health policy or finance and sees "budget guys" in health programs as somehow being on a first name basis with the devil.

Some advocacy groups, who naturally have the ear of Dems in the Senate, are concerned that Mr. Weems lacks the requisite substantive expertise in Medicare or Medicaid policy (well, make that Medicare, since unfortunately few inside the Beltway understand or track Medicaid). When a Republican is in charge of the White House, Dems and advocates are much more comfortable with an academic running CMS. And when a Democrat is in charge, they virtually insist on it. In its 30-year history, CMS (formerly named HCFA) has had nearly as many administrators and acting administrators. Add to this extremely high turnover the fact that CMS is rather unique in having a tiny number of political appointees.

There are notable exceptions. Gail Wilensky, Ph.D., one of the nation's most talented health policy experts, turned out to be an excellent administrator in the early 1990's. And there have been times where the agency was led by a budget guy, most notably Leonard Schaeffer, who ran HCFA is its early days. He came to HCFA from managing health budgets for the State of Illinois and later was the founding chairman and CEO of WellPoint.

Kerry Weems will have his hands full next month. But he's a smart fellow, with a keen sense for detail, and HHS and CMS staffs are briefing him around the clock in preparation. He'll do well before the Senate if given a fair shake.

As they move corporate resources from sales to R&D and attempt to adapt to new business dynamics, pharma and biotech companies must become far smarter in building the case for coverage and reimbursement. Increasingly, drug makers are understanding the need to build the case early in drug discovery and development, demonstrate the value proposition, and effectively communicate - or even partner - with payors (health plans, drug plans, PBMs) and purchasers (Medicare, Medicaid, employers).

To learn more, please listen to Mark Senak's latest podcast. In it, I briefly explain the need to build value-driven, payor-friendly cases for drug coverage and reimbursement and to do so early.

Eye on FDA is Mark Senak's popular blog on drug industry regulation, the FDA, and strategic communications strategies. In addition to providing thoughtful analyses and useful resources in his blog, Mark also podcasts interviews with industry executives, FDA officials, and top thought leaders.

Normally, $15 million a year doesn't buy you much in the federal government. A notable exception is the Effective Health Care Program at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Drug manufacturers, device makers, health plans, state Medicaid agencies, Wall Street analysts, physicians, and patient groups should all follow it closely.

The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) authorized AHRQ to conduct and support research on outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals, devices, and health care services. With a modest budget, a tiny but dedicated staff, and partnerships with top research institutions, AHRQ's Effective Health Care Program involves three approaches to research the comparative effectiveness of different medical treatments, drug therapies, and clinical practices:

1. Review and Synthesize Knowledge: AHRQ's network of 12 Evidence-based Practice Centers systematically review published and unpublished scientific evidence on what is known. Given the huge volume of studies and journal articles produced every year, it is next to impossible for providers, payors, and other key decision makers to keep up and even harder for them to thoughtfully weigh the evidence. AHRQ and its research partners synthesize the science and build a meaningful evidence base.

2. Promote and Generate New Knowledge: The DEcIDE Research Network studies new scientific evidence and analytic tools in an accelerated and practical format. DEcIDE stands for "Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness." Comprised of 13 university research centers and think tanks, the DEcIDE network conducts accelerated practical studies about the comparative clinical effectiveness, safety, and appropriateness of specific health care services, drugs, and devices. In other words, what works best for patients.

3. Compile Findings and Translate and Disseminate Knowledge to Decision Makers: AHRQ's John M. Eisenberg Clinical Decisions and Communications Science Center takes the research results and transform them into into a variety of useful, actionable formats for stakeholders (e.g., providers, payors, purchasers, patients, manufacturers). Specifically, these include (a) consumer guides (short summaries of health care research that can help with decisions about treatments), (b) clinician guides (brief evidence summaries to assist clinical decision making), (c) policymaker guides (short reports of research evidence for use in health care policy making), and (d) white papers on state-of-the-art concepts in health communication.

The past couple years, the initiative has focused on ten priority health care conditions, selected because of their high impact on Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other federal health programs:

Later this year, AHRQ will entertain nominations for other priority conditions.

Here's a sampling of the excellent work already generated. For a directory of these reports, with free access in PDF format, click here:

The Effective Health Care Program has 40 other reports in the works, covering a wide range of topics. These include more comparative effectiveness reviews of specific drugs as well as tools to measure quality, reduce errors, and monitor therapies. To get notified when new research becomes available, sign up for AHRQ's email list.

The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 (reintroduced as Senate Bill 484), sponsored by Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) and co-sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), is worth watching as the new Congress contemplates pharmaceutical industry legislation.

As proposed, The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 has five components:

1. Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require an application for approval for a new drug or biological product to include a proposed Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). Designed to be an integrated, flexible mechanism to acquire and adapt to new safety information about a drug, REMS would require (a) labeling for the drug for use by health care providers; (b) submission of reports for the drug; and (c) a statement as to whether the analysis and surveillance are sufficient to assess the serious risks of the drug. REMS is modeled after the risk management approach taken by the European Union.

2. Establishes a Drug Safety Oversight Board.

3. Requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the Reagan-Udall Institute for Applied Biomedical Research as a nonprofit corporation to advance the Critical Path Initiative to modernize medical product development, accelerate innovation, and enhance product safety. Requires the Institute to have a Board of Directors. Allows the Board to coordinate and collaborate with other entities to conduct research, education, and outreach and to modernize the sciences of developing, manufacturing, and evaluating the safety and effectiveness of diagnostics, devices, biologics, and drugs.

4. Amends the Public Health Service Act to require the Secretary, acting through the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to establish and administer a clinical trial registry database and a clinical trial results database. Requires a responsible party for a clinical trial to submit clinical trial information to the NIH Director for inclusion in the databases.

5. Requires each individual under consideration for a term on an FDA advisory committee providing advice or recommendations to the Secretary regarding FDA activities to disclose industry financial interests.

To learn more, check out the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions' hearing on the bill.

My sources in the Bush Administration tell me that the President will nominate Kerry Weems as the next administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Mr. Weems, a savvy finance expert with a long career at HHS, is well-liked by HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt, former Secretary Tommy Thompson, and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). He served as HHS' budget director and is now deputy chief of staff.

Nomination of Mr. Weems will be a departure from tradition. Historically, CMS administrators have been either academics or lobbyists. The academics often lack leadership and executive skills and the lobbyists often come across as too Machiavellian. Since the agency's creation in 1978, CMS (formerly called HCFA) has had about 30 administrators or acting administrators - about one per year. As a respected career insider, Mr. Weems is well positioned to deal with CMS' powerful, technocratic, hardworking but often demoralized bureaucracy.

Leslie Norwalk, CMS acting administrator, is expected to resign sometime in April. Ms. Norwalk, a health industry lawyer, was counselor to the CMS administrator (Tom Scully) from 2001-2004 and became deputy administrator in 2004.

Herb Kuhn will likely take over as acting administrator while Kerry Weems goes through the grueling Senate confirmation process. Mr. Kuhn, a highly respected hospital industry guru, has been director of CMS' Center for Medicare Management (CMM), which oversees Medicare Part A and Part B policy and Medicare's vast fee-for-service operations. Mr. Kuhn, has been serving as acting deputy administrator. He's a talented, well-liked fellow, and an excellent prospect for deputy administrator.

As CMS goes through the musical chairs, speculation is growing that HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt plans to leave and rejoin the private sector this spring.

Under a new Executive Order, President Bush has significantly expanded the authority of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over policymaking by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Specifically, OMB now has the authority to review and approve a vast array of written guidance issued day-to-day by CMS and FDA. The expansion of OMB's oversight authority has far-reaching implications for Medicare and Medicaid policy and the regulation of the drug and device industries.

In recent years, an increasing amount of agency policymaking has come in the form of "sub-regulatory guidance." That is, written guidance that does not go through the formal rulemaking process. In the case of CMS, this written guidance shows up, for example, as memorandums to health plans, letters to state officials, and manuals or other instructions. In its role administering the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the FDA has its own system of guidance documents.

While the FDA approach to sub-regulatory guidance has its own critics and limitations, the FDA approach is better organized and managed than CMS' approach. FDA has been at it longer than CMS but also has (relatively speaking) a narrower, more explicit scope of work. The FDCA and all its amendments is no walk in the park, but Titles 18, 19, and 21 of the Social Security Act are exercises in pure legislative surrealism.

President Bush's new Executive Order means that much of this written guidance is now subject to prior review and approval by OMB. While OMB has always been a key player, particularly in Medicare and Medicaid policy, the E.O. greatly increases OMB's influence and may result in a substantial power shift in many day-to-day issues affecting providers, health plans, drug manufacturers, states, and other stakeholders. (In the interest of full disclosure, my career includes service on OMB's Medicare and Medicaid team.)

For those interested in more background, below is a quick overview of the rulemaking process and the increasing role of written guidance in lieu of rules.

Background on OMB Regulatory Review:

Virtually all CMS and FDA proposed and final rules are subject to prior review and approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the powerful policy management arm of the White House. (It's important to note that OMB also reviews Medicare and Medicaid waivers, agency budget requests and legislative proposals, and written testimony to Congress.) OMB's regulatory oversight was created by Presidential Executive Order in the Reagan Administration and modified but retained by the Clinton Administration.

The basic idea is to help ensure that agency rulemaking activities follow the sitting President's policy objectives to the extent possible under the laws passed by Congress. OMB oversight also allows for a more thoughtful and disciplined approach to regulations, to keep track of the impact of agency rules on individuals, businesses, and states and guard against such things as unnecessary or excessive regulations and conflicting rules across different federal agencies.

In principle, the rulemaking process is designed to (1) inform the public of planned rules in detail; (2) give the public, including stakeholders and experts, an opportunity to comment, provide new information, and suggest alternatives; (3) ensure the rulemaking agency considers and responds to public comments before issuing final rules; (4) ensure that all federal rules can be found in a central publication (published in the Federal Register and formally codified in the Code of Federal Regulations); and (5) provide a comprehensive public record for use by the courts, Congress, and the news media in overseeing an agency's use of power and interpretation of statutes.

Written Guidance Instead of Formal Rules:

In other words, the formal rulemaking process provides for far more thoughtful, documented, and transparent policymaking than the so-called sub-regulatory guidance. However, developing proposed and final rules is a laborious process taking months and sometimes even years. And CMS faces the imperatives of implementing massive pieces of legislation, such as the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) and the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). Even if CMS always had the necessary staff, expertise, systems, and budget to implement the avalanche of Medicare and Medicaid legislation on time (it never does, unfortunately), there are just not enough hours in the day to promulgate all the necessary rules to meet statutory deadlines.

Therefore, much of CMS policymaking is done through written guidance, letters, memos, and memos - and not regulations. While it's easy to understand the practical pressures, many legal observers seriously question CMS's compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The APA, originally enacted in 1946, governs when and how agencies must go through the formal rulemaking process.

Privately, several players have told me how CMS's informal approach to many Medicare and Medicaid policies would likely not stand up in federal court. However, trade groups, states, and other stakeholders don't want to anger the increasingly powerful agency - and, in many cases, written guidance today is better than waiting months or even years for a rule.

Like its sister agency CMS, the FDA is increasingly using sub-regulatory guidance in lieu of formal rules. Given the demands facing the FDA, including a variety of reforms and pending legislative changes, this is expected to increase. To get a flavor, check out the list of guidance documents from the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDRR). You'll see it includes various backgrounders mixed with policy statements and instructions.

Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of Biotech

Summary: Why has the biotechnology industry failed to perform up to expectations - despite all its promise? In Science Business, Gary P. Pisano, Ph.D. answers this question by providing an incisive critique of the industry. Dr. Pisano not only reveals the underlying causes of biotech's problems; he offers the most sophisticated analysis yet on how the industry works. And he provides clear prescriptions for companies, investors, and policymakers seeking ways to improve the industry's performance. According to Dr. Pisano, the biotech industry's problems stem from its special character as a science-based business. This character poses three unique business challenges: (1) how to finance highly risky investments under profound uncertainty and long time horizons for R&D, (2) how to learn rapidly enough to keep pace with advances in drug science knowledge, and (3) how to integrate capabilities across a broad spectrum of scientific and technological knowledge bases.

The Business of Healthcare Innovation

Summary: Robert Lawton Burns, Ph.D., MBA focuses on the key role of the 'producers' as the main source of innovation in this wide-ranging analysis of business trends in the manufacturing branch of the health care industry. Written by industry academics and executives, the book provides a detailed overview of the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, genomics / proteomics, medical device, and information technology sectors. Most importantly, it describes the growing convergence between these sectors and the need for executives in one sector to increasingly draw upon trends in the others.

Overdose: How Excessive Government Regulation Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation

Summary: This book is the first to offer a comprehensive examination of the pharmaceutical industry by following the tortuous course of a new drug as it progresses from early development to final delivery. Richard A. Epstein looks closely at the regulatory framework that surrounds all aspects of making pharmaceutical products today, and he assesses which current legal and regulatory practices make sense and which have gone awry. While critics of pharmaceutical companies call for ever more stringent controls on virtually every aspect of drug development and approval, Professor Epstein cautions that the effect of such an approach will be to stifle pharmaceutical innovation and slow the delivery of beneficial treatments to the patients who need them.

The New Medicines: How Drugs are Created, Approved, Marketed, and Sold

Today, most people use prescription medications. Every year, the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry produces new medicines that treat everything from arthritis to AIDS, from high cholesterol to depression. But, despite recent controversies regarding the safety of drugs, consumers know little about the medications that they ingest and inject. How are these new medicines invented? How do consumers know that drugs are safe and effective? How are they tested? Who regulates their production - and who watches the regulators? How do drug companies produce the vast quantities needed for the marketplace, and why do they market their drugs as they do? The New Medicines (by Bernice Schacter, Ph.D.) leads the reader through the maze of the modern drug industry - from bench to bedside - and provides consumers with a step-by-step understanding of how new medicines are created, approved, marketed, and sold.

Inside the FDA: The Business and Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat

Because of the importance of what it regulates, the FDA comes under tremendous political, industry, and consumer pressure. But the pressure goes far beyond the ordinary lobbying of Washington trade groups. Its mandate - one quarter of the national economy - brings the FDA into the middle of some of the most important and contentious issues of modern society. From "designer" babies and abortion to the price of prescription drugs and the role of government itself, Inside the FDA takes readers on an intriguing journey into the world of today's most powerful consumer agency. In a time when companies continue to accuse the FDA of nitpicking and needlessly delaying needed new drugs, and consumers are convinced that the agency bends to industry pressure by rushing unsafe drugs to market, Inside the FDA digs deep to reveal the truth. Through scores of interviews and real-world stories, author Fran Hawthorne (senior contributing editor of Institutional Investor) also shows how and why the agency makes some of its most controversial decisions as well as how its recent reaction to certain issues - including the revolutionary cancer drug Erbitux, stem cell research, and bioengineering of food - may jeopardize its ability to keep up with future scientific developments.

More Excellent Books on Pharma and Biotech:

For additional reading on the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, and prescription drug issues, please check out my recommended reading lists:

Best Blog on FDA and Pharma Industry Communications:

For insightful, industry-savvy advice on the FDA, drug regulation, and pharma strategic communications, please visit Eye on FDA - the excellent blog by my friend and colleague Mark Senak, JD, senior vice president at Fleishman-Hillard.

With sound, furry, and a fair quota of sound bites and photo opps, House Democrats are pushing for quick adoption of H.R. 4, the Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2007. The bill would require the Secretary of HHS to negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers on drug prices in Medicare Part D.

As I explained in an earlier post, federal drug price negotiations would not generate savings above what are already achieved via the marketplace - unless Congress wants to severely limit the number of new and existing drugs available to seniors. However, the conclusion is counter intuitive to the uninitiated, especially given media hype and partisan palaver.

Today, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) told Rep. John Dingell, new Ways and Means Committee chairman, that federal drug price negotiations under H.R. 4 would save nothing. Here are the salient points of CBO's official estimate:

CBO estimates that H.R. 4 would have a negligible effect on federal spending because we anticipate that the Secretary would be unable to negotiate prices across the broad range of covered Part D drugs that are more favorable than those obtained by PDPs under current law. Since the legislation specifically directs the Secretary to negotiate only about the prices that could be charged to PDPs, and explicitly indicates that the Secretary would not have authority to negotiate about some other factors that may influence the prescription drug market, we assume that the negotiations would be limited solely to a discussion about the prices to be charged to PDPs. In that context, the Secretary's ability to influence the outcome of those negotiations would be limited. For example, without the authority to establish a formulary, we believe that the Secretary would not be able to encourage the use of particular drugs by Part D beneficiaries, and as a result would lack the leverage to obtain significant discounts in his negotiations with drug manufacturers.

Instead, prices for covered Part D drugs would continue to be determined through negotiations between drug manufacturers and PDPs. Under current law, PDPs are allowed to establish formularies - subject to certain limits - and thus have some ability to direct demand to drugs produced by one manufacturer rather than another. The PDPs also bear substantial financial risk and therefore have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts in order to control their costs and offer coverage that attracts enrollees through features such as low premiums and cost-sharing requirements. Therefore, the PDPs have both the incentives and the tools to negotiate drug prices that the government, under the legislation, would not have. H.R. 4 would not alter that essential dynamic.

To read CBO's letter to Chairman Dingell, click here (PDF). To learn more about the issue, please check out my earlier story.

In the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), Congress made a series of significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing, Medicaid best price rebates, and Medicaid payments to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The new policies, which are expected to save the feds and states $8.4 billion over the next five years, create major challenges to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies.

DRA Drug Pricing Changes in a Nutshell:

While the DRA has many moving parts, in general the new policies will:

1. Drive more Medicaid drug spending toward generics and reduce the market advantages of authorized generics.

2. Make Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) - a key measure of drug prices in the marketplace and the metric used in determining Medicaid rebates - transparent to the public. Previously, AMP was confidential and known only to government officials.

3. Lower AMP on many prescription drugs, putting drug makers under increased cost pressures and increasing Medicaid rebates to states.

4. Increase the compliance risks of drug manufacturers.

5. Reduce Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies.

6. Put another nail in the coffin of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) by moving Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement systems from AWP to AMP.

Federal Proposed Rules:

Today, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released proposed rules on implementing the DRA drug pricing policies. Final rules are expected in June 2007.

However, because key provisions are effective on January 1, 2007, pharma companies must come into compliance based on incomplete guidance and be prepared to make major changes again this summer.

DRA Changes to Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price:

The law requires significant changes to how drug manufacturers calculate Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and Medicaid Best Price (BP), reducing the market power of some key price concessions used by manufacturers:

Drug manufacturers must report AMP on a monthly basis starting January 2007. More importantly, average manufacturer prices on all drugs will publicly posted on CMS' website starting Spring 2007 after CMS resolves some data and systems issues. Previously, reporting was quarterly and confidential by law.

DRA also mandates significant changes to the federal upper payment limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs. The feds are widening the definition of what is a multiple source drug and setting FUL at 250% of AMP. Previously, FUL was set at 150% of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). This will further increase pricing pressure on brand drugs when generics are available.

Operational Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Industry:

The drug industry faces many practical, operational challenges in meeting the new requirements for 2007:

1. Incomplete federal guidance. Until the final rules arrive, the drug industry must implement the DRA changes with limited federal guidance. Key factors still unclear include class of trade designations, treatment of administrative and service fees, adjusting for lagged price concessions and returned goods, correcting and restating AMP, and a variety of baseline AMP issues.

2. Moving from quarterly to more complex monthly reporting, plus adjusting for each month's transactions.

3. Adapting data, systems, staff, and reporting to accommodate different pricing methodologies required by CMS. For example, calculating and reporting AMP under Medicaid vs. calculating and reporting Average Sales Price (ASP) under Medicare Part B.

Financial Challenges of DRA for Pharmaceutical Companies:

The new DRA policies also pose significant financial challenges for pharma companies. For example:

Compliance Challenges of DRA for Drug Manufacturers:

The DRA changes present new or expanded compliance challenges for drug manufacturers. Given the frequency, changes, and overall complexity, there are many ways to inadvertently screw up federal reporting. Ensuring compliance will require heavy reliance on other parts of company and on external partners. Transparency of pricing will likely lead to new regulations, audits, and Congressional hearings. Finally, while over time DRA reporting may make it easier to defend against suits, companies should expect dramatic increase in whistleblower suits under federal and state False Claims Acts.

Learn More:

For the DRA statutory changes affecting drug pricing, click here (PDF).

For the proposed rule, click here (PDF). For CMS' fact sheet on the proposed rule, click here (PDF).

Read the OIG's recommendations to the HHS Secretary on DRA implementation issues. The OIG report includes useful background information.

For more information or a briefing, feel free to contact me.

There's a lot of truth in the old joke about the problem with Republicans and Democrats: Republicans need a heart and Democrats need a brain. As Democrats prepare to take control of Congress, they appear eager to prove the joke by pursuing legislation to require government "negotiations" on prescription drug prices in Medicare Part D.

The idea has emotional appeal, so let's see if there is any evidence to support the idea. (If you come from the Bumper Sticker School of Health Policy, stop here. The facts will only confuse you and don't easily make for emotive talking points.)

Non-Interference Requirement in MMA:

In the Medicare Moderation Act, the massive 2003 legislation that created the Medicare Part D drug benefit among other Medicare reforms, Congress prohibited the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from interfering with drug pricing in the competitive market. Part D prescription drug plans - Medicare Advantage drug plans (MA-PDs) and prescription drug plans (PDPs) - would battle among themselves to cut the best deals with pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies and openly compete for enrollees.

The statute at controversy, found at section 1860D-11(i) of the Social Security Act, is short and sweet:

(i) NONINTERFERENCE. In order to promote competition under this part and in carrying out this part, the Secretary:

(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and

(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.

Estimated Savings of Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Supporters of federal staff negotiating drug prices argue that it would generate billions of dollars in savings for taxpayers and seniors. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - the highly respected, non-partisan fiscal advisor to both houses of Congress and the agency that officially scores the cost and savings of all legislative proposals - agrees with top health economists and Medicare experts that federal price negotiations will save precisely zip.

Following passage of MMA, Senate leaders asked CBO to examine the effect of striking the 'noninterference' provision. CBO reported:

We estimate that striking that provision would have a negligible effect on federal spending because CBO estimates that substantial savings will be obtained by the private plans and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree. Because they will be at substantial financial risk, private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts, both to control their own costs in providing the drug benefit and to attract enrollees with low premiums and cost-sharing requirements.

CBO was then asked if the federal government could save anything if CMS centrally negotiated prices with makers of single-source drugs. (Single-source prescription drugs are brand-name drugs that have no generic equivalent on the market and are generally available from only one manufacturer.) Again, CBO concluded that savings are unlikely, unless of course federal officials are willing to play hardball and restrict patient access to therapeutically unique drugs until the manufacturers agree to government price demands:

Most single-source drugs face competition from other drugs that are therapeutic alternatives. CBO believes that there is little, if any, potential savings from negotiations involving those single-source drugs. We expect that risk-bearing private plans will have strong incentives to negotiate price discounts for such drugs and that the Secretary would not be able to negotiate prices that further reduce federal spending to a significant degree.

Nevertheless, there is potential for some savings if the Secretary were to have the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of single-source drugs that do not face competition from therapeutic alternatives. Private plans offering a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries will have less leverage in negotiating discounts for drugs without therapeutic alternatives than they have in price negotiations for drugs that do face such competition. (In that regard, the Medicare plans will be no different than private health plans that offer prescription drug coverage to other populations.)

Under current law, there already are significant pressures that limit the prices that manufacturers charge for drugs - whether those drugs face competition from therapeutic alternatives or not. Those pressures include the prospects that plans will not cover a drug (or will substantially limit the amount they pay for a drug) and that manufacturers will provoke a backlash (potentially including legislation) if they set prices too high. Moreover, the creation of the Medicare drug benefit has given federal officials greater opportunity and incentive than under prior law to bring pressure on manufacturers - for example, by influencing public opinion and policy makers--if the prices that manufacturers set for single-source drugs that are not subject to competition from therapeutic alternatives are perceived as being too high. Giving the Secretary an additional tool--the authority to negotiate prices with manufacturers of such drugs - would put greater pressure on those manufacturers and could produce some additional savings.

Ample Evidence Against Federal Drug Price Negotiations:

Not only would federal price negotiations save little or nothing compared to the increasingly competitive private marketplace, there are host of other arguments against the idea.

In a fascinating new study - The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and Pharmaceutical Innovation - Benjamin Zycher, Ph.D., an economist and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Medical Progress, carefully "estimates the impact that federal negotiation of prescription drug prices would have on pharmaceutical research and development (R & D) investment through 2025."

Dr. Zycher concludes that, while federal price negotiations could save some Medicare dollars, "the longer-term human costs of government price-negotiation...are likely to be large and adverse." Most notably, the data show government mandated negotiations would dramatically reduce the development of new, life-saving drugs (about a dozen annually), resulting in "...a loss of 5 million expected life-years annually, an adverse effect that can be valued conservatively at about $500 billion per year, an amount far in excess of total annual U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals."

In Compromising Quality: The High Cost of Government Drug Purchasing, Edmund F. Haislmaier provides a crisp, devastating critique of the idea of federal drug price negotiations. He disects the core myths and outlines how it would only serve to threate